Notes and Comments on Phaedo -- 24

14 August 2023

Notes and Comments on Phaedo – 24

Continuing with my series on Phaedo.  I am using the Harold North Fowler translation published by the Loeb Classical Library.

“’Consider, then, the matter in another way.  When the soul and the body are joined together, nature directs the one to serve and be ruled, and the other to rule and be master.  Now this being the case, which seems to you like the divine, and which like the mortal?  Or do you not think that the divine is by nature fitted to rule and lead, and the mortal to obey and serve?’

“’Yes, I think so.’

“’Which, then, does the soul resemble?’

“’Clearly, Socrates, the soul is like the divine and the body like the mortal.’

“’Then see, Cebes, if this is not the conclusion from all that we have said, that the soul is most like the divine and immortal and intellectual and uniform and indissoluble and ever unchanging, and the body, on the contrary, most like the human and mortal and multiform and unintellectual and dissoluble and ever changing.  Can we say anything, my dear Cebes, to show that this is not so?’

“’No, we cannot.’

“’Well then, since this is the case, is it not natural for the body to meet with speedy dissolution and for the soul, on the contrary, to be entirely indissoluble, or nearly so?’

“’Of course.’

“’Observe,’ he went on, ‘that when a man dies the visible part of him, the body, which lies in the visible world and which we call the corpse, which is naturally subject to dissolution and decomposition, does not undergo these processes at once, but remains for a considerable time, and even for a very long time, if death takes place when the body is in good condition, and at a favourable time of the year.  For when the body is shrunk and embalmed, as is done in Egypt, it remains almost entire for an incalculable time.  And even if the body decay, some parts of it, such as the bones and sinews and all that, are, so to speak, indestructible.  Is not that true?’

“’Yes.’

“’But the soul, the invisible, which departs into another place which is, like itself, noble and pure and invisible, to the realm of the god of the other world in truth, to the good and wise god, whither, if God will, my soul is soon to go, -- is this soul, which has such qualities and such a nature, straightway scattered and destroyed when it departs from the body, as most men say?  Far from it, dear Cebes and Simmias, but the truth is much rather this: -- if it departs pure, dragging with it nothing of the body, because it never willingly associated with the body in life, but avoided it and gathered itself into itself alone, since this has always been its constant study – but this means nothing else than that it pursued philosophy rightly and really practiced being in a state of death: or is not this the practice of death?’

“’By all means.’

“’Then if it is in such a condition, it goes away into that which is like itself, into the invisible, divine, immortal, and wise, and when it arrives there it is happy, freed from error and folly and fear and fierce loves and all the other human ills, and as the initiated say, lives in truth through all after time with the gods.  Is this our belief, Cebes, or not?’

“’Assuredly,’ said Cebes.”

(Ibid, Fowler pages 279 – 283, 80 – 81)

1. Having presented to Cebes and Simmias the contrast between the compounded and uncompounded, and between the visible and the invisible, Socrates offers another way of looking at the issue under discussion, which is the nature of the soul.  Here Socrates uses the analogy of the ruler and the ruled.  The idea is that the soul rules the body because the body is dependent upon the soul.  The body is dependent on the soul because Life, as found in the noetic, is the source for the soul's capacity to animate material existences such as the body.  The soul animates material existences such as the body through participation in the noetic form of Life as such.

2.  I want to remark briefly about the use of the term ‘intellectual’ in this part of the discussion.  Presumably this is derived from the translation of ‘nous’ as ‘Intellect.’ which is a widely used way of referring to the second hypostasis.  I have mentioned before that the usage of ‘intellect’ and ‘intellectual’ is, I think, along with others, problematic.  Some use the word ‘mind’ and if that word was used we might refer to the soul as something like ‘consciousness.’ 

The problem with words like ‘intellect’ and ‘intellectual’ when used in these contexts is that they have become, in modernity, firmly tied to the analytical function of the human mind.  Intellectuals are ‘smart,’ which means they have a highly functional capacity for analyzing things into component parts, for breaking down arguments and disputes into associated and derivative assertions; at times this can be dizzying, especially if you are on the receiving end of this kind of activity.

But ‘nous’ is not a realm where things are broken down into component parts.  Nous, when compared to the material realm, is a realm of far greater unity, not differentiation.  In modernity analysis means differentiation and intellect is the tool that is used to differentiate things. 

(As an aside, many of these differentiations of modernity are conjured; by ‘conjured’ I mean that they have no actual basis even in material reality, let alone in the noetic.  They are conjured specifically for the purposes of creating greater differentiation even if there is no necessity to do so.)

The reason Socrates so often uses the method of analogy or metaphor in the course of his disputes with others (and why the Platonic dialogues so often have allegories as the central teaching mode) is that these methods draw attention to what various things have in common.  When we say that X is like Y, we are saying that X and Y share some aspect of existence.  This is a step towards unifying X and Y, whereas analysis, using intellect, separates things by focusing on differentiations.

I understand that the use of ‘Intellect’ and ‘Intellectual’ in the translations of Plato’s Dialogues has a long history.  And the idea of dispensing with these terms may seem somewhat overwrought.  Nevertheless, I think that being aware of how ‘intellect’ and ‘intellectual’ are being used in Platonism, and how that usage differs in significant ways from how those words are used commonly today, helps readers to follow what Socrates is saying and trying to accomplish in a dialogue like Phaedo.

3.  The comment Socrates makes about the body not dissolving all at once, but over a possibly long period of time, eludes me as to its import.  Perhaps Socrates is speaking humorously here and by reminding Cebes and Simmias of the details of the body’s disintegration Socrates is stressing the body’s utterly material nature. 

4.  Socrates refers to the happiness the soul feels after death when it ascends to the noetic.  Socrates further emphasizes that the soul is, following what amounts to its rebirth in the noetic, free from fear, fierce loves, and other human ills.

Socrates states that this is the destiny of the soul if and only if it has studied philosophy and through that study separated itself from the body as much as possible.  This brings into the discussion the understanding of what we today would call ‘karma,’ or ‘karmic consequences.’  That is to say that our destiny in the afterlife is contingent upon our behavior in the life we have lived (and in lives before this one).  In the next section, Socrates will illuminate what happens to a soul that has not studied philosophy and that such a soul’s destiny is very different.