Wednesday, August 23, 2023

Notes and Comments on Phaedo -- 25

23 August 2023

Notes and Comments on Phaedo – 25

Continuing with my series on Phaedo, I am using the Harold North Fowler translation published by the Loeb Classical Library.

“’But I think, if when it departs from the body it (the soul – my addition) is defiled and impure, because it was always with the body and cared for it and loved it and was fascinated by it and its desires and pleasures, so that it thought nothing was true except the corporeal, which one can touch and see and drink and eat and employ in the pleasures of love, and if it is accustomed to hate and fear and avoid that which is shadowy and invisible to the eyes but is intelligible and tangible to philosophy – do you think a soul in this condition will depart pure and uncontaminated?’

“’By no means,’ said he.

“’But it will be interpenetrated, I suppose, with the corporeal which intercourse and communion with the body have made a part of its nature because the body has been its constant companion and the object of its care?’

“’Certainly.’

“’And, my friend, we must believe that the corporeal is burdensome and heavy and earthly and visible.  And such a soul is weighed down by this and is dragged back into the visible world, through fear of the invisible and of the other world, and so, as they say, it flits about the monuments and the tombs, where shadowy shapes of souls have been seen, figures of those souls which were not set free in purity but retain something of the visible; and this is why they are seen.’

“’That is likely, Socrates.’

“’It is likely, Cebes.  And it is likely that those are not the souls of the good, but those of the base, which are compelled to flit about such places as a punishment for their former evil mode of life.  And they flit about until through the desire of the corporeal which clings to them they are again imprisoned in a body.  And they are likely to be imprisoned in natures which correspond to the practices of their former life.’

“’What natures do you mean, Socrates?’

“’I mean, for example, that those who have indulged in gluttony and violence and drunkenness, and have taken no pains to avoid them, are likely to pass into the bodies of asses and other beasts of that sort.  Do you not think so?’

“’Certainly that is very likely.’

“’And those who have chosen injustice and tyranny and robbery pass into the bodies of wolves and hawks and kits.  Where else can we imagine that they go?’

“’Beyond a doubt,’ said Cebes, ‘they pass into such creatures.’

“’Then,’ said he, ‘it is clear where all the others go, each in accordance with its own habits?’

“’Yes,’ said Cebes, ‘of course.’

“’Then,’ said he, ‘the happiest of those, and those who go to the best place, are those who have practiced, by nature and habit, without philosophy or reason, the social and civil virtues which are called moderation and justice?’

“’How are these happiest?’

“’Don’t you see?  Is it not likely that they pass again into some such social and gentle species as that of bees or of wasps or ants, or into the human race again, and that worthy men spring from them?’

“’Yes.’

“’And no one who has not been a philosopher and who is not wholly pure when he departs, is allowed to enter into the communion of the gods, but only the lover of knowledge.  It is for this reason, dear Simmias and Cebes, that those who truly love wisdom refrain from all bodily desires and resist them firmly and do not give themselves up to them, not because they fear poverty or loss of property, as most men, in their love of money, do; nor is it because they fear the dishonour or disgrace of wickedness, like the lovers of honour and power, that they refrain from them.’

“’No, that would not be seemly for them, Socrates,’ said Cebes.

“’Most assuredly not,’ said he.  ‘And therefore those who care for their own souls, and do not live in service to the body, turn their backs upon all these men and do not walk in their ways, for they feel that they know not whither they are going.  They themselves believe that philosophy, with its deliverance and purification, must not be resisted, and so they turn and follow it withersoever it leads.’

“’How do they do this, Socrates?’

“’I will tell you,’ he replied.  ‘The lovers of knowledge,’ said he, ‘perceive that when philosophy first takes possession of their soul it is entirely fastened and welded to the body and is compelled to regard realities through the body as through prison bars, not with its own unhindered vision, and is wallowing in utter ignorance.  And philosophy sees that the most dreadful thing about the imprisonment is the fact that it is caused by the lusts of the flesh, so that the prisoner is the chief assistant in his own imprisonment.  The lovers of knowledge, then, I say, perceive that philosophy, taking possession of the soul when it is in this state, encourages it gently and tries to set it free, pointing out that the eyes and the ears and the other senses are full of deceit, and urging it to withdraw from these, except in so far as their use is unavoidable, and exhorting it to collect and concentrate itself within itself, and to trust nothing except itself and its own abstract thought of abstract existence; and to believe that there is no truth in that which it sees by other means and which varies with the various objects in which it appears, since everything of that kind is visible and apprehended by the senses, whereas the soul itself sees that which is invisible and apprehended by the  mind.  Now the soul of the true philosopher believes that it must not resist this deliverance, and therefore it stands aloof from pleasures and lusts and griefs and fears, so far as it can, considering that when anyone has violent pleasures or fears or griefs or lusts he suffers from them not merely what one might think – for example, illness or loss of money spent for his lusts – but he suffers the greatest and most extreme evils and does not take it into account.’

“’What is this evil, Socrates?’ said Cebes.

“’The evil is that the soul of every man, when it is greatly pleased or pained by anything, is compelled to believe that the object which caused the emotion is very distinct and very true; but it is not.  These objects are mostly the visible ones, are they not?’

“’Certainly.’

“’And when this occurs, is not the soul most completely put in bondage by the body?’

“’How so?’

“’Because each pleasure or pain nails it as with a nail to the body and rivets it on and makes it corporal, so that it fancies the things are true which the body says are true.  For because it has the same beliefs and pleasures as the body it is compelled to adopt also the same habits and mode of life, and can never depart in purity to the other world, but mut always go away contaminated with the body; and so it sinks quickly into another body again and grows into it, like seed that is sown.  Therefore it has no part in the communion with the divine and pure and absolute.’

“’What you say, Socrates, is very true,’ said Cebes.

“’This, Cebes, is the reason why the true lovers of knowledge are temperate and brave; not the world’s reason.  Or do you disagree?’

“’Certainly not.’

“’No, for the soul of the philosopher would not reason as others do, and would not think it right that philosophy should set it free, and that then when set free it should give itself again into bondage to pleasure and pain and engage in futile toil, like Penelope unweaving the web she wove.  No, his soul believes that it must gain peace from these emotions, must follow reason and abide always in it, beholding that which is true and divine and not a matter of opinion, and making that its only food; and in this way it believes it must live, while life endures, and then at death pass on to that which is akin to itself and of like nature, and be free from human ills.  A soul which has been nurtured in this way, Simmias and Cebes, is not likely to fear that it will be torn asunder at its departure from the body and will vanish into nothingness, blown apart by the winds, and be no longer anywhere.’”

(Ibid, Fowler, pages 283 – 293, 81B-84B)

1.  There is a lot of material in this part of Phaedo about how rebirth works; such as the destiny of different types of people.  In addition, there is a lot of insight on how different types of attachment to the body, such as pleasure and pain, generate the soul’s fixation on the body, making it difficult for the soul to focus instead on that which shares the soul’s transcendental nature. 

2.  The passage begins by describing what happens to a soul that is associated with someone who has not taken the opportunity for purification and the practice of philosophy that a human life offers.  In such a situation the soul is “defiled and impure.”  This contrasts with the previous passage I posted on Phaedo which refers to the sublime afterlife experiences of those who have practiced philosophy. 

What Socrates is communicating to those around him are the benefits of withdrawing from involvement in material, sensory, existence, and attachment to the body.  Such practice shifts the philosopher’s attention to the soul and that which is akin to the soul; that which is noetic and eternal, and beyond that to the One. 

This is the basic view of Platonism and its basic practice.

3.  It is interesting that Socrates puts forth the idea that ghosts who hang around graveyards are doing so because of their intense attachment to the body during their lifetime.  Socrates regards this as a kind of ‘punishment’ for living such a life of attachment.

4.  There follows speculations by Socrates of the rebirth destiny of those who have not lived a philosophical life.  One thing I noticed is that Socrates does not seem to have the idea that successive rebirths necessarily result in better circumstances.  I do not notice any teaching along those lines.  That idea, that each rebirth results in greater understanding and therefore each rebirth is superior to the last, is widely presented today among those who adhere to rebirth.  It is often associated with the idea of an ‘evolutionary’ development of the soul to higher and higher understanding and development.

I think Socrates does not have that point of view because for Socrates the soul is inherently associated with the noetic already.  The barrier to this understanding is attachment to sensory experience, but as that attachment is reduced the association of the soul with higher hypostases becomes clear on its own.  It is kind of like having a very valuable ring on your finger but being completely unaware of its presence because of our involvement with sensory stimulation.  Now and then we may glance at the ring, but though its beauty is obvious, and that is why it is worn, we are unable to understand its real value which is that its beauty is an instantiation of noetic Beauty.

5.  Socrates notes that people’s rebirth destiny is “in accordance with their own habits.”  This is the basic way that the Platonic tradition, and Dharmic traditions as well, understand how rebirth destiny happens.

6.  “And no one who has not been a philosopher and who is not wholly pure when he departs, is allowed to enter into the communion of the gods, but only the lover of knowledge.  It is for this reason, dear Simmias and Cebes, that those who truly love wisdom refrain from all bodily desires . . .”  This statement sums up the ascetic foundations of Platonism and points to the essentially ascetic nature of the Platonic Way.

7.  At the end of Socrates unpacking the basic contrast between a philosophical life and a non-philosophical life, Socrates refers to “the greatest and most extreme evil” which most people do not take into account.  The greatest evil that Socrates refers to, he explains, is that they believe those objects that cause pleasure or pain are distinct and true.  By ‘distinct’ I think Socrates is referring to the idea that these sources of pleasure and pain are stable, when in fact they are constantly changing, constantly in a state of becoming and begoning.  By ‘true’, I take Socrates to be referring to the idea that bodily pleasure and pain are in some sense like mathematical truths, that is to say in some sense transcendental, when actually pleasure and pain are fleeting realities at best.  They are ephemeral and not a foundation for a life devoted to wisdom.

8.  Because of my many years devoted to the study and practice of Buddhism I could not help but note that in the Buddhist discourses there is a similar teaching about pleasure and pain; that the constant focus on pleasure and pain undermines things like equanimity, insight, and wisdom.  I find the parallels on this particular topic of great interest.

9.  Socrates skillfully brings this discussion to the cultivation of virtue, using temperance and bravery as his two examples.  This is a striking example of the relationship between the cultivation of virtue and the freeing of the soul from material attachments.  Here Socrates is reminding those around him of this connection and how such cultivation is linked to a good rebirth.

I understand temperance to be similar to Buddhist equanimity.  It is the ability to not be thrown off center when tempted by pleasure or repelled by pain.  It is the realization that the cyclic back and forth of bodily pleasure and pain is simply the result of having a body; accepting that reality but not getting caught up in it, or basing one’s life on it is the remedy to attachment to pleasure and pain.

Early in Phaedo Socrates introduces the nature of pleasure and pain when Socrates comments on his physical feelings after his chains have been removed by the jailer, “What a strange thing, my friends, that seems to be which men call pleasure!  How wonderfully it is related to that which seems to be its opposite, pain, in that they will not both come to a man at the same time, and yet if he pursues the one and captures it, he is generally obliged to take the other also . . . “ (Fowler, page 209, 60B)

Socrates is using his own situation of having been chained and experiencing pleasure and pain due to this, as a symbol for the human condition as whole, which is brought up at this point in the dialogue.

10.  This section ends with Socrates affirming that the soul of those who have practiced philosophy will return to that which the soul is akin to and of like nature.  That is because the soul is always dwelling in the divine; when the soul is released from material attachments it becomes aware of its true home in eternity.

 

 

 

 

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