Notes and Comments on Phaedo -- 39

29 September 2023

Notes and Comments on Phaedo – 39

Continuing with my series on Phaedo; I am using the Harold North Fowler translation published by the Loeb Classical Library:

“’But my friends, ‘ he said, ‘we ought to bear in mind, that, if the soul is immortal, we must care for it, not only in respect to this time, which we call life, but in respect to all time, and if we neglect it, the danger now appears to be terrible.  For if death were an escape from everything, it would be a boon to the wicked, for when they die they would be freed from the body and from their wickedness together with their souls.  But now, since the soul is seen to be immortal, it cannot escape from evil or be saved in any other way than by becoming as good and wise as possible.  For the soul takes with it to the other world nothing but its education and nurture, and these are said to benefit or injure the departed greatly from the very beginning of his journey thither.  And so it is said that after death, the tutelary genius of each person, to whom he had been allotted in life, leads him to a place where the dead are gathered together; then they are judged and depart to the other world with the guide whose task it is to conduct thither those who come from this world; and when they have received their due and remained through the time appointed, another guide brings them back after many long periods of time.  And the journey is not as Telephus says in the play of Aeschylus; for he says a simple path leads to the lower world, but I think the path is neither simple nor single, for if it were, there would be no need of guides, since no one could miss the way to any place if there were only one road.  But really there seem to be many forks of the road and many windings; this I infer from the rites and ceremonies practiced here on earth.  Now the orderly and wise soul follows its guide and understands its circumstances; but the soul that is desirous of the body, as I said before, flits about it, and in the visible world for a long time, and after much resistance and many sufferings is led away with violence and with difficulty by its appointed genius.  And when it arrives at the place where the other souls are, the soul which is impure and has done wrong, by committing wicked murders or other deeds akin to those and the works of kindred souls, is avoided and shunned by all, and no one is willing to be its companion or its guide, but it wanders about alone in utter bewilderment, during certain fixed times, after which it is carried by necessity to its fitting habitation.  But the soul that has passed through life in purity and righteousness, finds gods for companions and guides, and goes to dwell in its proper dwelling.  Now there are many wonderful regions of the earth, and the earth itself is neither in size nor in other respects such as it is supposed to be by those who habitually discourse about it, as I believe on someone’s authority.’

“And Simmias said, ‘What do you mean, Socrates?  I have heard a good deal about the earth myself, but not what you believe; so I should like to hear it.’

“’Well Simmias, I do not think I need the art of Glaucus to tell what it is.  But to prove that it is true would, I think, be too hard for the art of Glaucus, and perhaps I should not be able to do it; besides, even if I had the skill, I think my life, Simmias, will end before the discussion could be finished.  However, there is nothing to prevent my telling what I believe the form of the earth to be, and the regions in it.’

“’Well,’ said Simmias, ‘that will be enough.’

“’I am convinced, then,’ said he, ‘that in the first place, if the earth is round and in the middle of the heavens, it needs neither the air nor any other similar force to keep it from falling, but its own equipoise and the homogeneous nature of the heavens on all sides suffice to hold it in place; for a body which is in equipoise and is placed in the center of something which is homogeneous cannot change its inclination in any direction, but will remain always in the same position.  This, then, is the first thing of which I am convinced.’

“’And righty,’ said Simmias.

“’Secondly,' said he, ‘I believe that the earth is very large and that we who dwell between the pillars of Hercules and the river Phasis live in a small part of it about the sea, like ants or frogs about a pond, and that many other people live in many other such regions.  For I believe there are in all directions on the earth many hollows of very various forms and sizes, into which the water and mist and air have run together; but the earth itself is pure and is situated in the pure heaven in which the stars are, the heaven which those who discourse about such matters call the ether; the water, mist and air are the sediment of this and flow together into the hollows of the earth.  Now we do not perceive that we live in the hollows, but think we live on the upper surface of the earth, just as if someone who lives in the depth of the ocean should think he lived on the surface of the sea, and, seeing the sun and the stars through the water, should think the sea was the sky, and should by reason of sluggishness or feebleness, never have reached the surface of the sea, and should never have seen, by rising and lifting his head out of the sea into our upper world, and should never have heard from anyone who had seen, how much purer and fairer it is than the world we lived in.  Now I believe this is just the case with us; for we dwell in a hollow of the earth and think we dwell on its upper surface; and the air we call the heaven, and think that is the heaven in which the stars move.  But the fact is the same, that by reason of feebleness and sluggishness, we are unable to attain to the upper surface of the air, for if anyone should come to the top of the air or should get wings and fly up, he could lift his head above it and see, as fishes lift their heads out of the water and see the things in our world, so he would see things in that upper world; and, if his nature were strong enough to bear the sight, he would recognize that that is the real heaven and the real light and the real earth.  For this earth of ours, and the stones and the whole region where we live, are injured and corroded, as in the sea things are injured by the brine, and nothing of any account grows in the sea, and there is, one might say, nothing perfect there, but caverns and sand and endless mud and mire, where there is earth also, and there is nothing at all worthy to be compared with the beautiful things of our world.  But the things in that world above would be seen to be even more superior to those in this world of ours.  If I may tell a story, Simmias, about the things on the earth that is below the heaven, and what they are like, it is well worth hearing.’

“’By all means, Socrates,’ said Simmias; ‘we should be glad to hear this story.’”

(Ibid, Fowler, pages 369-377, 107C-110B)

1.  This is the beginning of a shift in Phaedo to a primarily mythic and analogical presentation of the realities of rebirth.  The presence of myth is part of the complex fabric of Phaedo from the beginning where the story of Theseus and the Minotaur plays a significant role.  The difference here is that Socrates seems to have reached an end to his presentation of arguments about rebirth and is now starting to speak of those realities as best he can.  This resembles a group of people talking about a particular composer’s worth, and then shifting to listening to the music. 

2.  Some of these presentations on the realities of rebirth and the post-death world are complex, others are fairly straightforward.  It is my view that Socrates is drawing on ancient traditions that, I suspect, his pupils had already been introduced to.  Tentatively, I think that the Pythagorean and Orphic traditions may be primary sources for what Socrates relates.  In addition, the teachings of various mystery traditions may also have contributed to an understanding of how rebirth works and the details of how someone takes on their next life.

3.  Socrates begins this section with an argument, similar to the one’s he has been presenting (but notice that he does not ask Simmias or Cebes for their agreement; instead Socrates simply presents the argument and leaves it there). 

This argument is that we must take care for our soul, and not just during this life, but for all time; meaning life after life until we ascend to that which is timeless.  Needing to take care of the soul for all time implies that the soul survives and that therefore there is some point in doing so.  Socrates points out that if the soul suffers dissolution at death that this would be a ‘boon for the wicked’ because the wicked would be able to escape the consequences of the actions of their lives.

This is, in my opinion, a powerful argument.  Secular materialists often argue that the reason people believe in rebirth is that they are afraid of dying because dying means annihilation.  Secular materialists do not accept the existence of a soul, or other non-material realities.  Absent non-material realities, it makes sense that secular materialists would psychologize the basis for accepting rebirth.

But Socrates’s point here undermines the secular analysis of belief in rebirth by pointing out that rejecting rebirth may happen because people fear that they will have to endure the consequences of their misbehaviors if rebirth is true.  From this perspective, rebirth and karmic consequences are intimately connected.

4.  Socrates states that we take with us into the after death experience our education and our nurture; that is quite a lot.  This view emphasizes the importance that education, training, nurture have not just for this life, but for future lives as well.

5.  The first thing that happens after death, according to this presentation, is that the person who has died is met by their ‘tutelary deity.’  The Focus Philosophical Library uses the word ‘spirit.’  The Greek word is ‘daemon.’  Socrates, in Apology talks about his relationship with his personal spirit, tutelary deity, or daemon and seems to have had interaction with it over a period of many years.  The daemon is similar to a guardian angel.  In some traditions this spirit guide might not have a human appearance; instead it may be a spirit animal.  The basic idea is that each person has a spirit guide or presence that assists that person throughout their life.  It is this spirit that meets the deceased and takes him to a gathering of the deceased where they are ‘judged.’ 

The spirit guide takes the recently deceased person to the ‘other world’ in accordance with how they have been judged.  After this judgment has been served, another guide brings them back ‘after many long periods of time.’

There are complexities and caveats to this basic outline such as the soul that is strongly desirous of a body may remain stuck in the visible, material, world for a long time before being able to move on to its judgment and subsequent consequences. 

Socrates mentions a play by Aeschylus called ‘Telephus.’  The story of Telephus is complex, involving interactions with many gods and heroes, including being wounded, and then healed by Achilles who was on his way to the Trojan War.  For our purposes, the reference to the play by Aeschylus means that the kind of inquiry into the specifics of the after death experience were discussed openly in Greek society and there seem to have been multiple traditions, which is why Socrates takes issue with Aeschylus’s presentation in the play.

6.  Socrates details the difficulties those who have ‘done wrong,’ such as committing murder and other deeds of that kind, will experience after death.  They will be shunned, and no one will want to be their guide.  Because of this they wander for a ‘fixed time’ (which I read as ‘in accordance with the nature of their deeds’) until they are carried by ‘necessity’ (causation?) to their ‘fitting habitation.’  This is a description of what we today would call ‘karma.’  And it is these karmic consequences that the materialist seeks to escape.

7.  In contrast, those who have lived a life of purity have companions, and even gods to assist and guide them.  Again, this is a description of karmic consequences for how someone has lived their life.  Taken together, this is why we should take care of the soul.

8.  Socrates then shifts the discussion to his thoughts about the earth and its regions.  His thoughts about this are based on ‘someone’s authority,’ but that someone goes unnamed.  Perhaps this is another example of a widely known view and the person did not have to be specifically named;  I say that because otherwise, I think, Cebes or Simmias would have asked for more background.

8.1  Socrates observes that he does not need the 'art of Glaucus' to tell those gathered his views about the Earth.  The 'gift of Glaucus' is the gift of prophecy.  Glaucus is a sea-god who was originally a human mortal who was a fisherman and diver.  He ate a magical herb, leaped into the sea, and became an immortal with the gift of prophecy.  (Leaping into the sea, or other bodies of water, is a regular theme in Phaedo.)  I understand the consuming of the herb to be consuming the truths of philosophy.  I understand leaping into the sea as plumbing the depths of wisdom.  I understand becoming an immortal as the philosopher entering into the noetic reality, and then, eventually becoming one with the One.  I understand the 'gift of prophecy' as the gift of being able to reveal to others the Way of Philosophy.  This would imply that Socrates is being ironically humble when he implies a distance from the gift of Glaucus; in a way Socrates is indicating to his students that he and Glaucus share many archetypal similarities.

9.  The description of the earth given by Socrates does not fit with our current cosmology.  However, it is possible to read this kind of presentation allegorically. 

I see the description of the earth as in equipoise and being held in place, not inclined in any material direction, as a description of the philosophical mind after many years, and many lifetimes, of practice.  The advanced practitioner has achieved balance, equanimity, and is not thrown off balance by surprise events or material setbacks.  The advanced practitioner is ‘centered,’ an often used description of someone in meditation.

10.  Socrates then describes the earth as filled with ‘hollows’ of ‘various forms.’  I think a takeaway from this is that human beings do not know where they live and are unaware of their actual situation; that is to say they are ignorant of their actual situation.

This description reminds me of the allegory of the cave, found in The Republic, where human beings are chained and only see shadows on the wall of the cave, but mistake them for reality.  In a similar way, human beings in this allegory are confined to hollows but think that is the full reality of their situation.  This is a central teaching of Platonism and allegory seems to be the chosen way to present this teaching. 

This situation of being placed in hollows keeps people from realizing the presence of ‘that world,’ the world beyond their hollows.  Socrates contrasts the two realms, saying that the ‘whole region (of the earth) is injured and corroded.’  In contrast, things in the upper world are the ‘real light’ and the ‘real earth.’ 

This is a mythic, or allegorical, presentation of the material realm in contrast with the noetic realm.  Socrates has indicated in a number of arguments the nature of noetic realities.  Here Socrates is describing earthly and noetic realities using beautifully crafted images to inspire those who are listening on the path of philosophy and to give further encouragement for the care of the soul.

 

 

Notes and Comments on Phaedo -- 11.1

27 September 2023

Notes and Comments on Phaedo – 11.1

Continuing with my series on Phaedo, I am using the Harold North Fowler translation published by the Loeb Classical Library:

“The body and its desires are the only cause of wars and factions and battles; for all wars arise for the sake of gaining money, and we are compelled to gain money for the sake of the body.  We are slaves to its service.”

(Ibid, Fowler, page 231, 66D)

1.  This is an addendum to my post from 28 June 2023.  I had intended to comment on the portion quoted above, but forgot to do so at that time.  In recent posts the focus has been on causation as it applies to the existence of, and immortality of, the soul.  All this talk about causation cast my mind back to this passage; I suddenly recalled that I had not posted a comment about this particular passage.  The connection is that Socrates is giving us a causal analysis of the origins of war in this quote and that was what linked it to the discussions about causation I have been posting about recently.

2.  I think what brought me back to this quote is all the discussion about opposites.  This led me to consider the opposites of ‘war and peace.’  And the only place in Phaedo where war is discussed is in this quote.

3.  Socrates argues that the only cause of war is the body and its desires.  War is fought to fulfill those desires.  Subsidiary to this is the desire for money; but the desire for money is to fulfill the desires of the body.

This is an analysis at the level of material causation, or psychological causation (I regard psychological causation as material in nature).  The view leads to the conclusion that as long as human beings are embodied there will be war.  It is an example of a modus ponens argument:

If there is a body

Then there will be war.

Human beings have a body.

Therefore human beings will have war(s).

It is interesting to me that this is one of the few places where Socrates uses syllogistic to make a point.

4.  This also implies that efforts to bring about peace that do not recognize the pivotal, causal, role of bodily desire will fail.  That is to say that simply rearranging material conditions will not lead to peace according to this analysis.

5.  If you think that war is a terrible thing (and most people do not think it is terrible), then this kind of analysis is a strong motivator for separating the soul from the body as much as possible so that you are free from the impulses that are foundational for war.

6.  The passage is an application of what I call the Ascetic Ideal and provides us with a good reason for entering into the ascetic practices that are recommended in Phaedo.  By rejecting a life based on acquisition and money, by separating ourselves as much as possible from the body, we undermine the causal ground from which wars emerge.  This is a great gift and benefit to the individuals practicing asceses, but it is also a great gift and benefit to all of humanity; not because the Platonist Ascetic is doing this for the benefit of humanity as a whole, rather the benefit to all simply flows from the nature of ascetic practice in the way that light and life flow from the sun, in the way that the scent of flowers is born on the wind.

7.  Asceticism is the ground of true peace.

8.  Another way of looking at this is that peace comes from knowledge of, and experience of, the noetic.  That is to say that peace is a noetic reality, not a material reality.  This understanding resembles the Platonic understanding of beauty.  There is beauty on earth, but the beauty found on earth is an emanation of the Beauty that has its home in nous.  Platonists recognize the significance of beauty as a kind of gate to higher realities.  We accomplish this ascent to noetic Beauty by observing diverse instantiations of beauty (such as a beautiful rock, a beautiful house, a beautiful melody, and so forth) and then shifting our attention from the beautiful object to Beauty as such.

In a similar way, there are, at times, which are increasingly rare, manifestations of peace in the material realm.  Some of these are very ordinary such as when we have a conversation with a good friend and the verbal back and forth flows easily and without rancor, even when there is disagreement.  Sometimes the experience of peace will appear while watching a sunset or some other natural appearance.  But these examples of peace are here because they instantiate noetic peace.  And the same contemplative procedure can be used that we used to experience Beauty as such, meaning noetic beauty, to experience Peace as such, meaning noetic peace.  I mean contemplating examples of peace in our life and then shifting our attention to Peace as such. 

9.  There is support for this view of war and peace, and that peace is not a part of this material world, in the Theravada Buddhist Discourses.  When asked what is Nibbana (Nirvana), the Buddha would, at times, respond, “Nibbana is peace.”  Nibbana is the ‘other shore’, the transcendental that is ‘beyond beyond.’

10.  We live in the realm of differentiation, the third hypostasis.  This differentiation, combined with material desires, leads to constant friction that often erupts in war.  As both Heraclitus and Empedocles said, strife is an omnipresent, elemental, feature of material reality.

If we want to find true peace we must shift our attention to the transcendental.  We shift our attention to the transcendental by following the Ascetic Ideal.  When we follow the Ascetic Ideal we will experience true peace.

Notes and Comments on Phaedo -- 38

24 September 2023

Notes and Comments on Phaedo – 38

Continuing with my series of posts on Phaedo; I am using the Harold North Fowler translation published by the Loeb Classical Library:

“’Well then, Cebes,’ said he, ‘if the odd were necessarily imperishable, would not the number three be imperishable?’

“’Of course.’

“’And if that which is without heat were imperishable, would not snow go away whole and unmelted whenever heat was brought in conflict with snow?  For it could not have been destroyed, nor could it have remained and admitted the heat.’

“’That is very true,’ he replied.

“’In the same way, I think, if that which is without cold were imperishable, whenever anything cold approached fire, it would never perish or be quenched, but would go away unharmed.’

“’Necessarily,’ he said.

“’And must not the same be said of that which is immortal?  If the immortal is also imperishable, it is impossible for the soul to perish when death comes against it.  For, as our argument has shown, it will not admit death and will not be dead, just as the number three, we said, will not be even, and the odd will not be even, and as fire, and the heat in the fire, will not be cold.  But, one might say, why is it not possible that the odd does not become even when the even comes against it (we agreed to that), but perishes, and the even takes its place?  Now we cannot silence him who raises this question by saying that it does not perish, for the odd is not imperishable.  If that were conceded to us, we could easily silence him by saying that when the even approaches, the odd and the number three go away; and we could make the corresponding reply about fire and heat and the rest, could we not?’

“’Certainly.’

“’And so, too, in the case of the immortal; if it is conceded that the immortal is imperishable, the soul would be imperishable as well as immortal, but if not, further argument is needed.’

“’But,’ he said, ‘it is not needed, so far as that is concerned; for surely nothing would escape destruction, if the immortal, which is everlasting, is perishable.’

“’All, I think,’ said Socrates, ‘would agree that God and the principle of life, and anything else that is immortal, can never perish.’

“’All men would, certainly,’ said he, ‘and still more, I fancy, the Gods.’

“’Since, then, the immortal is also indestructible, would not the soul, if it is immortal, be also imperishable?’

“’Necessarily.’

“’Then when death comes to a man, his mortal part, it seems, dies, but the immortal part goes away unharmed and undestroyed, withdrawing from death.’

“’So it seems.’

“’Then, Cebes,’ said he, ‘it is perfectly certain that the soul is immortal and imperishable, and our souls will exist somewhere in another world.’

“’I,’ said Cebes, ‘have nothing more to say against that, and I cannot doubt your conclusions.  But if Simmias, or anyone else, has anything to say, he would do well to speak, for I do not know to what other time than the present he could defer speaking, if he wishes to say or hear anything about those matters.’

“’But,’ said Simmias, “I don’t see how I can doubt, either, as to the result of the discussion; but the subject is so great, and I have such a poor opinion of human weakness, that I cannot help having some doubt in my own mind about what has been said.’

“’Not only that, Simmias,’ said Socrates, ‘but our first assumption ought to be more carefully examined, even though they seem to you to be certain.  And if you analyze them completely, you will, I think, follow and agree with the argument, so far as it is possible for man to do so.  And if this is made clear, you will seek no farther.’

"'That is true,' he said."

(Ibid, Fowler, pages 365 – 367, 106A-107B)

1.  Here Socrates emphasizes the immortality of the soul based on the imperishable nature of that which is immortal.  Socrates compares other imperishable realities, such as threeness and oddness, to the soul and argues from their similarity that all of them are imperishable and immortal. 

Socrates has laid the groundwork for this inference, step by step leading his listeners to this conclusion.

2.  It is interesting that Socrates entertains a critical counter to his argument in the form of a hypothetical; ‘But, one might say, why is it not possible that the odd does not become even when the even comes against it, but perishes, and the even takes its place?’  I don’t recall Socrates using too many hypotheticals in Phaedo (though I admit I wasn’t paying close attention to this while reading).  Hypotheticals allow someone to pre-empt a possible objection even when it is not brought up.  Perhaps Socrates suspected that Simmias or Cebes, or perhaps someone else in the group at the jail, of being inclined to raise this kind of objection.

3.  ‘All, I think, would agree that God and the principle of life, and anything else that is immortal, can never perish.’ 

The Focus Philosophical Library translation reads as follows:  ‘And the god, I think, and the form itself of Life – and anything else, if it’s un-dying – would be agreed by all never to perish.’  (Ibid, Focus Philosophical Library translation of Phaedo, page 89)

The Focus translation refers to ‘the form itself of Life’, whereas the Loeb translation by Fowler says ‘the principle of life.’  I think the Focus translation, by referring to the Form of Life itself, makes it clearer that Socrates is referring to noetic realities when Socrates is talking about the immortal or undying.  It is in the Noetic realm that one contacts the unchanging, the deathless, the immortal, and undying.  The closest one can come to the deathless in the third hypostasis of becoming and begoning is by contacting the perpetual which is guided by the world soul through the instantiation of number in the realm of time. 

The implication is that the soul is the presence of the noetic in the realm of becoming and begoning.  As I like to say, the soul is the presence of eternity in the ephemeral individual.  The presence of eternity is a noetic reality and in the human being this presence is the soul which itself transcends becoming and begoning.

4.  The Fowler translation uses the word ‘God’, which is used in a variety of Platonic sources as a way of talking about the One, the first hypostasis.  In the Focus translation they use ‘the god’, which I take to mean a noetic reality, implying, I think, a noetic deity rather than the fully transcendental One that is beyond affirmation or negation.  This makes more sense to me because Socrates is not saying at this time that the immortality of the soul is beyond discussion, which is what would be implied if he were referring to the One.  Rather Socrates is asserting the efficacy of his argument based on noetic realities.

5.  Simmias is a bit hesitant at the conclusion of this section, based on his own observation of human ‘weakness’, which I assume means he is referring to his own weakness.  Simmias may be feeling a bit overwhelmed with the many twists and turns in the complex arguments (logoi) that have been presented about the soul and its immortal nature.  That makes sense to me because these arguments are not self-evident; they require study and contemplation before their structure and meaning are clear.

Socrates encourages Simmias to examine the arguments again even though Simmias has assented to them.  I think this means that Socrates has picked up on the remark Simmias makes about human ‘weakness.’  But Socrates asserts that if Simmias does follow them out, and study the arguments rigorously, Simmias will come to see that he need not seek any further.

This is good news for us.  It encourages us to review the arguments and implicitly affirms that we can do so on our own because Socrates is about to depart.  Socrates trusts both the arguments and our capacity to comprehend them.  This is based on the noetic experiences that Socrates has had and his understanding that because the soul is the presence of the noetic within us, that we can have those same foundational experiences ourselves.

Notes and Comments on Phaedo -- 37

22 September 2023

Notes and Comments on Phaedo – 37

Continuing the series on Phaedo; I am using the Harold North Fowler translation published by the Loeb Classical Library:

“’Then,’ said Socrates, ‘please begin again at the beginning.  And do not answer my questions in their own words, but do as I do.  I give an answer beyond that safe answer which I spoke of at first, now that I see another safe reply deduced from what has just been said.  If you ask me what causes anything in which it is to be hot, I will not give you that safe but stupid answer and say that it is heat, but I can now give a more refined answer, that it is fire; and if you ask, what causes the body in which it is to be ill, I shall not say illness, but fever; and if you ask what causes a number in which it is to be odd, I shall not say oddness, but the number one, and so forth.  Do you understand sufficiently what I mean?’

“’Quite sufficiently,’ he replied.

“’Now answer,’ said he.  ‘What causes the body in which it is to be alive?’

“’The soul,’ he replied.

“’Is this always the case?’

“’Yes,’ said he, ‘of course.’

“’Then if the soul takes possession of anything it always brings life to it?’

“’Certainly,’ he said.

“’Is there anything that is the opposite of life?’

“’Yes,’ said he.

“’What?’

“’Death.’

“’Now the soul, as we have agreed before, will never admit the opposite of that which it brings with it.’

“’Decidedly not.’

“’Then what do we now call that which does not admit the idea of the even?’

“’Uneven,’ said he.

“’And those which do not admit justice and music?’

“’Unjust,’ he replied, ‘and unmusical.’

“’Well then what do we call that which does not admit death?’

“’Deathless or immortal.’

“’Yes.’

“’Very well,’ said he.  ‘Shall we say then that this is proved?’

“’Yes, and very satisfactorily, Socrates.’

(Ibid, Fowler, pages 363-365, 105B-106A) At th

1.  One of the interesting things about Platonist discourse is how that discourse is framed depends on the cosmological placement of what is being asserted or discussed.  For example, when talking about beauty, how Platonists talk about beauty will depend on which hypostasis the beauty is manifesting in.  Beauty in the material realm is impermanent.  Beauty in the noetic realm is permanent.  There are many examples like this.  In many Platonist writings the author makes the assumption that the audience understands this; for that reason this is not very often explained.  Rather this way of dealing with realities reveals itself to the contemporary reader only after some familiarity that is born out of repeated reading of various Platonic source texts such as the Dialogues of Plato and the Enneads of Plotinus.

In this part of Phaedo Socrates is shifting back to causation observed at the material level, but the level of reference is actually the elemental realm rather than sensation-based materiality.  Before Socrates said that he had found a ‘safe’ answer for how causation happens; that something is beautiful due to Beauty as such, meaning noetic beauty.  Here Socrates is saying that he has found ‘another’ which rejects the idea that something is hot due to heat as such, meaning noetic heat.  Here Socrates says that the cause of heat is ‘fire.’  I understand this to mean elemental fire, the kind of fire that Heraclitus and Empedocles refer to in their Presocratic works. 

This is yet another level in which Platonic discussion operates at.  Elemental realities usually consist of four types: Earth, Water, Fire, and Air.  Empedocles added two other elementals, Love and Strife, to make six.  These elementals were understood to combine in various proportions to make up the sensory world that we observe.  But the elementals themselves are not observable, they are inferred.  The elementals function a little bit like the various atoms in the periodic table, though I don’t want to overstate the similarity.  Greek elementals are based on metaphorical inference rather than scientific, or experimental, observation.  In addition, elementals are stated by philosophers like Heraclitus to transform into each other in a cycle of elemental creation and destruction.  From this perspective, elementals are more like types of energy.

But the elementals are found in the third hypostasis; they are not noetic forms.  In a sense, elementals are a material explanation for things.  The elementals are a vehicle for understanding why sense-based materiality has the variety of manifestations that it has.

Socrates is suggesting that an elemental explanation for heat, the presence of elemental fire, is ‘safer’ at this juncture of the discussion than a strictly material one, or a noetic explanation.  I believe this is because Socrates has shifted the discussion as to why things seem to appear and disappear, why they are at one period of time ‘seen’, and then at another period of time they are ‘unseen,’ in the material world.  The flow of elemental presences offers an explanatory framework for why and how this happens.  Sense based materiality does not do so because it is simply too coarse.  Noetic realities does not do so because noetic realities are unchanging.  But elemental realities do offer a vehicle for this kind of discussion.

2.  In the Fowler translation Socrates says that his previous explanation about heat was ‘safe but stupid.’  In the Focus Philosophical Library translation Socrates says that his previous answer was ‘safe but unlearned.’  This is a significant difference.  I think that Socrates is saying that his previous answer was unlearned because he had not taken into consideration elemental realities before and so his answer was not complete.

(Plato’s Phaedo, translated by Eva Brann, Peter Kalkavage, and Eric Salem, Focus Philosophical Library, and imprint of Hackett Publishing, Indianapolis, 1998, page 87, ISBN: 9780941051699)

3.  Seeing things, and understanding them, from an elemental perspective is very helpful for understanding the third hypostasis in which we live.  It opens up the underlying fluid nature of our existence as the elementals transform into other elementals and thereby transform our sensory world.  It is helps us to understand things like seasonal flow and change, the stages of human life, geological shifts, and, which ultimately the goal of Socrates, the appearance and disappearance of living manifestations such as human life.  Human life is observed to appear and disappear in this elemental flow.

But there is an aspect of human life that lies beyond elemental change.  That is the soul.  Socrates likens the soul to oddness in the number three. Just as three will always be odd, the soul will always be life as such, a living reality. 

4.  At the conclusion of this part of the dialogue Socrates asks if the deathless nature of soul has been ‘proved.’  The response is that it has been proved.  This opens the question of what Socrates, and the participants in the dialogue, mean by proof.  The core of the approach Socrates takes in his arguments (logoi) is what I have previously referred to as metaphorical inference, which also includes devices like simile and allegory.  Here Socrates is saying that the soul, because of its nature, cannot admit the presence of death, and this is like, or resembles, the musical not admitting the unmusical, and the odd not admitting the even.  (In some sense the implication is that musicality and the evenness of numbers like two, are immortal, or deathless in the way that the soul is.)  This is an argument from pointing to resemblances that can be observed or understood, but which then implies that there are other resemblances that are significant but have been overlooked.  That is to say, one resemblance leads us to another resemblance, the one we are more interested in.

This is what Socrates is using to convince his listeners.  I think it is helpful to understand this, otherwise we might think Socrates is using some more modern structure of inference, or some more formal structure of inference, and look for it in vain. 

Do we find such arguments convincing?  I think the way to answer that is through contemplating the arguments, logoi, which means at least allowing yourself to be open to them.  As I mentioned in a previous post, these arguments can be used as the basis for contemplation; from a contemplative perspective much of their meaning becomes clear.

Notes and Comments on Phaedo -- 36

19 September 2023

Notes and Comments on Phaedo – 36

Continuing with my series on Phaedo; I am using the Harold North Fowler translation published by the Loeb Classical Library:

“’The fact is,’ said he (Socrates), ‘in some such cases, that not only the abstract idea itself has a right to the same name through all time, but also something else, which is not the idea, but which always, whenever it exists, has the form of the idea.  But perhaps I can make my meaning clearer by some examples.  In numbers, the odd must always have the name of odd, must it not?’

“’Certainly.’

“’But is this the only thing so called (for this is what I mean to ask), or is there something else, which is not identical with the odd but nevertheless has a right to the name of odd in addition to its own name, because it is of such a nature that it is never separated from the odd?  I mean, for instance, the number three, and there are many examples.  Take the case of three; do you not think it may always be called by its own name and also be called odd, which is not the same as three?  Yet the number three and the number five and half of numbers in general are so constituted, that each of them is odd though not identified with the idea of odd.  And in the same way two and four and all the other series of numbers are even, each of them, though not identical with evenness.  Do you agree, or not?’

“’Of course,’ he replied.

“’Now see what I want to make plain.  This is my point, that not only abstract opposites exclude each other, but all things which, although not opposites one to another, always contain opposites; these also, we find, exclude the idea which is opposed to the idea contained in them, and when it approaches they either perish or withdraw.  We must certainly agree that the number three will endure destruction or anything else rather than submit to becoming even, while still remaining three, must we not?’

“’Certainly,’ said Cebes.

“’But the number two is not the opposite of the number three.’

“’No.’

“’Then not only opposite ideas refuse to admit each other when they come near, but certain other things refuse to admit the approach of opposites.’

“’Very true,’ he said.

“’Shall we then,’ said Socrates, ‘determine if we can, what these are?’

“’Certainly.’

“’Then, Cebes, will they be those which always compel anything of which they take possession not only to take their form but also that of some opposite?’

“’What do you mean?’

“’Such things as we were speaking of just now.  You know of course that those things in which the number three is an essential element must be not only three but also odd.’

“’Certainly.’

“’Now such a thing can never admit the idea which is the opposite of the concept which produces this result.’

“’No, it cannot.’

“’But the result was produced by the concept of the odd?’

“’Yes.’

“’And the opposite of this is the idea of the even?’

“’Yes.’

“’Then the idea of the even will never be admitted by the number three.’

“’No.’

“’Then three has no part in the even.’

“’No, it has none.’

“’Then the number three is uneven.’

“’Yes.’

“’Now I propose to determine what things, without being the opposites of something, nevertheless refuse to admit it, as the number three, though it is not the opposite of the idea of even, nevertheless refuses to admit it, but always brings forward its opposite against it, and as the number two brings forward the opposite of the odd and for that of cold, and so forth, for there are plenty of examples.  Now see if you accept this statement: not only will opposites not admit their opposites, but nothing which brings an opposite to that which it approaches will ever admit in itself the oppositeness of that which is brought.  Now let me refresh your memory; for there is no harm in repetition.  The number five will not admit the idea of the even, nor will ten, the double of five, admit the idea of the odd.  Now ten is not itself an opposite, and yet it will not admit the idea of the odd; and so one-and-a-half and other mixed fractions and one-third and other simple fractions reject the idea of the whole.  Do you go with me and agree to this?’

“’Yes, I agree entirely,’ he said, ‘and am with you.’

(Ibid, Fowler, pages 357-363, 103E-105C)

1.  I am going to contrast Fowler’s translation of the first part of this section with the translation by Eva Brann, Peter Kalkavage, and Eric Salem, published by the Focus Philosophical Library:

“’So it’s the case,’ said he (Socrates), ‘about some things of this sort, that the Form Itself isn’t the only thing worthy of the form’s name for all time; there’s also something else, something that is not that form but, whenever it is, always has the shape of that form.  But perhaps what I mean will be still plainer in this example: I suppose the Odd must always happen on this very name which we are not uttering – or not?’

(Plato’s Phaedo, translated by Eva Brann, Peter Kalkavage, and Eric Salem, Focus, an imprint of Hackett Publishing Company, Indianapolis, 1998, page 85, 103E, ISBN: 9780941051699)

I want to highlight the difference between Fowler’s ‘the abstract idea itself’ with ‘the Form Itself.’  Fowler has used ‘abstract’ or ‘abstract idea’ a number of times.  The difficulty I have with this kind of usage is that abstract is often used to mean an intellectual distillation.  In scientific contexts, such as to ‘abstract data’ it means to deduce something from material observation; in other words the abstraction is built on the foundation of the observation of material instances.

This is particularly true for British Empiricism as John Locke describes the process.  The view is that the mind/brain cannot retain all the sensory impressions it receives and the mind therefore abstracts from the cacophony of sense impressions pertinent ideas, or rather ideas emerge from that process of abstraction from sense impressions.  This depiction of the relationship between ideas and materiality infers that ideas are built from the ground up, as it were; I mean that ideas are dependent upon sense impressions which are, in turn, dependent upon material things impressing themselves upon the human organism.

But this is the opposite of how Platonism views this, and it is far from what Socrates it attempting to illuminate in Phaedo.  Of course the word isn’t always, or even primarily, used in this context of British Empiricism.  In ordinary discourse the word ‘abstract’ means something like ‘not concrete’, or not taking concrete things into consideration.  But in a philosophical context, such as Phaedo, I think there may be a tendency to understand ‘the abstract idea itself’ in an Empiricist way, or to inadvertently lean in that direction. 

Perhaps I am overstating this; on the other hand, The Focus translation of ‘the Form Itself’, along with the use of capitals, avoids this kind of philosophical confusion.  This phrase is also used by some other translators, such as R. Hackforth in his commentary on Phaedo. A phrase like ‘the Form Itself’ I read as referring to the Form as a reality residing in the noetic as opposed to Form that is present in the material dimension through participation. 

2.  Notice how the analysis by Socrates is becoming more complex, more refined, as he sharpens his analysis.  I think that is why there appear confusions among those listening; such confusion can also appear for the reader.  An argument like this needs to be read and absorbed over a period of time, with a number of readings, as well as some contemplation.  It is OK to be unsure about the parameters and inferences of the discussion, especially on the first encounter.  With the first reading you might pick up a few points that are being made, while some other points remain obscure.  Again, that is OK.  Through rereading and contemplation the meaning will gradually emerge.  It’s a bit like learning a new language.

3.  Socrates is shifting his focus primarily, though not exclusively, to types of numbers; in this case even and odd numbers.  Socrates is laying out a kind of mental geography as to how ideas relate to each other.  He is arguing that there is a kind of relationship between ideas such that ideas have a kind of range of application and outside of that range they either wither or withdraw into their own ecology where they can thrive.  He is suggesting that this is true for all ideas just as it has been demonstrated to be true for opposites such as hot and cold. 

4.  I think that Socrates is laying out a kind of taxonomy of ideas that Aristotle would later write about in detail in works like Categories.  When Socrates notes that the number three is always, eternally, odd, but that the number three is not oddness itself, he is illuminating the manner in which ideas are related to each other, nested within each other, nourished and the manner in which they participate with each other.  Oddness is a higher, meaning more remote from materiality, idea than that of threeness.  Threeness is dependent on oddness, but the range of oddness is much greater than that of threeness.  Threeness participates in oddness and oddness is the form that, when differentiated, generates threeness.  There is a hierarchical relationship between them with oddness being the source of threeness along with an infinite number of other numbers.

5.  What is the point of all this discussion about opposites and their nature.  First, Socrates will soon bring this back to the nature of soul and link it with his view of the immortality of the soul.  In the first round of discussions about opposites he does the same thing, linking the discussion back to the nature of soul.

The second is clarity as to the way the human mind works.  When we become familiar with how the mind works, and its relationship to higher hypostases such as the noetic realm, this means becoming more familiar with these higher realities, more relaxed with experiences of them, and better able to negotiate the divine ascent which is the central purpose of the Platonic tradition.  It’s like a cook becoming familiar with all the ingredients used in cooking, how they react at certain temperatures, how they combine with other ingredients, and how they generate the end product of bread or some other nourishing food.  Here becoming familiar with noetic realities and their relationship to the material world allows us to follow the web-roads of meaning back to their source in the noetic, and beyond the noetic to the source of all, the Good and the One.