Notes and Comments on Phaedo -- 38

24 September 2023

Notes and Comments on Phaedo – 38

Continuing with my series of posts on Phaedo; I am using the Harold North Fowler translation published by the Loeb Classical Library:

“’Well then, Cebes,’ said he, ‘if the odd were necessarily imperishable, would not the number three be imperishable?’

“’Of course.’

“’And if that which is without heat were imperishable, would not snow go away whole and unmelted whenever heat was brought in conflict with snow?  For it could not have been destroyed, nor could it have remained and admitted the heat.’

“’That is very true,’ he replied.

“’In the same way, I think, if that which is without cold were imperishable, whenever anything cold approached fire, it would never perish or be quenched, but would go away unharmed.’

“’Necessarily,’ he said.

“’And must not the same be said of that which is immortal?  If the immortal is also imperishable, it is impossible for the soul to perish when death comes against it.  For, as our argument has shown, it will not admit death and will not be dead, just as the number three, we said, will not be even, and the odd will not be even, and as fire, and the heat in the fire, will not be cold.  But, one might say, why is it not possible that the odd does not become even when the even comes against it (we agreed to that), but perishes, and the even takes its place?  Now we cannot silence him who raises this question by saying that it does not perish, for the odd is not imperishable.  If that were conceded to us, we could easily silence him by saying that when the even approaches, the odd and the number three go away; and we could make the corresponding reply about fire and heat and the rest, could we not?’

“’Certainly.’

“’And so, too, in the case of the immortal; if it is conceded that the immortal is imperishable, the soul would be imperishable as well as immortal, but if not, further argument is needed.’

“’But,’ he said, ‘it is not needed, so far as that is concerned; for surely nothing would escape destruction, if the immortal, which is everlasting, is perishable.’

“’All, I think,’ said Socrates, ‘would agree that God and the principle of life, and anything else that is immortal, can never perish.’

“’All men would, certainly,’ said he, ‘and still more, I fancy, the Gods.’

“’Since, then, the immortal is also indestructible, would not the soul, if it is immortal, be also imperishable?’

“’Necessarily.’

“’Then when death comes to a man, his mortal part, it seems, dies, but the immortal part goes away unharmed and undestroyed, withdrawing from death.’

“’So it seems.’

“’Then, Cebes,’ said he, ‘it is perfectly certain that the soul is immortal and imperishable, and our souls will exist somewhere in another world.’

“’I,’ said Cebes, ‘have nothing more to say against that, and I cannot doubt your conclusions.  But if Simmias, or anyone else, has anything to say, he would do well to speak, for I do not know to what other time than the present he could defer speaking, if he wishes to say or hear anything about those matters.’

“’But,’ said Simmias, “I don’t see how I can doubt, either, as to the result of the discussion; but the subject is so great, and I have such a poor opinion of human weakness, that I cannot help having some doubt in my own mind about what has been said.’

“’Not only that, Simmias,’ said Socrates, ‘but our first assumption ought to be more carefully examined, even though they seem to you to be certain.  And if you analyze them completely, you will, I think, follow and agree with the argument, so far as it is possible for man to do so.  And if this is made clear, you will seek no farther.’

"'That is true,' he said."

(Ibid, Fowler, pages 365 – 367, 106A-107B)

1.  Here Socrates emphasizes the immortality of the soul based on the imperishable nature of that which is immortal.  Socrates compares other imperishable realities, such as threeness and oddness, to the soul and argues from their similarity that all of them are imperishable and immortal. 

Socrates has laid the groundwork for this inference, step by step leading his listeners to this conclusion.

2.  It is interesting that Socrates entertains a critical counter to his argument in the form of a hypothetical; ‘But, one might say, why is it not possible that the odd does not become even when the even comes against it, but perishes, and the even takes its place?’  I don’t recall Socrates using too many hypotheticals in Phaedo (though I admit I wasn’t paying close attention to this while reading).  Hypotheticals allow someone to pre-empt a possible objection even when it is not brought up.  Perhaps Socrates suspected that Simmias or Cebes, or perhaps someone else in the group at the jail, of being inclined to raise this kind of objection.

3.  ‘All, I think, would agree that God and the principle of life, and anything else that is immortal, can never perish.’ 

The Focus Philosophical Library translation reads as follows:  ‘And the god, I think, and the form itself of Life – and anything else, if it’s un-dying – would be agreed by all never to perish.’  (Ibid, Focus Philosophical Library translation of Phaedo, page 89)

The Focus translation refers to ‘the form itself of Life’, whereas the Loeb translation by Fowler says ‘the principle of life.’  I think the Focus translation, by referring to the Form of Life itself, makes it clearer that Socrates is referring to noetic realities when Socrates is talking about the immortal or undying.  It is in the Noetic realm that one contacts the unchanging, the deathless, the immortal, and undying.  The closest one can come to the deathless in the third hypostasis of becoming and begoning is by contacting the perpetual which is guided by the world soul through the instantiation of number in the realm of time. 

The implication is that the soul is the presence of the noetic in the realm of becoming and begoning.  As I like to say, the soul is the presence of eternity in the ephemeral individual.  The presence of eternity is a noetic reality and in the human being this presence is the soul which itself transcends becoming and begoning.

4.  The Fowler translation uses the word ‘God’, which is used in a variety of Platonic sources as a way of talking about the One, the first hypostasis.  In the Focus translation they use ‘the god’, which I take to mean a noetic reality, implying, I think, a noetic deity rather than the fully transcendental One that is beyond affirmation or negation.  This makes more sense to me because Socrates is not saying at this time that the immortality of the soul is beyond discussion, which is what would be implied if he were referring to the One.  Rather Socrates is asserting the efficacy of his argument based on noetic realities.

5.  Simmias is a bit hesitant at the conclusion of this section, based on his own observation of human ‘weakness’, which I assume means he is referring to his own weakness.  Simmias may be feeling a bit overwhelmed with the many twists and turns in the complex arguments (logoi) that have been presented about the soul and its immortal nature.  That makes sense to me because these arguments are not self-evident; they require study and contemplation before their structure and meaning are clear.

Socrates encourages Simmias to examine the arguments again even though Simmias has assented to them.  I think this means that Socrates has picked up on the remark Simmias makes about human ‘weakness.’  But Socrates asserts that if Simmias does follow them out, and study the arguments rigorously, Simmias will come to see that he need not seek any further.

This is good news for us.  It encourages us to review the arguments and implicitly affirms that we can do so on our own because Socrates is about to depart.  Socrates trusts both the arguments and our capacity to comprehend them.  This is based on the noetic experiences that Socrates has had and his understanding that because the soul is the presence of the noetic within us, that we can have those same foundational experiences ourselves.