Notes and Comments on Phaedo -- 29

2 September 2023

Notes and Comments on Phaedo – 29

Continuing with my Notes and Comments on Phaedo, I am using the Harold North Fowler translation published by the Loeb Classical Library.

“’But we must get to work,’ he (Socrates) said.  ‘First refresh my memory, if I seem to have forgotten anything.  Simmias, I think, has doubts and fears that the soul, though more divine and excellent than the body, may perish first, being of the nature of a harmony.  And, Cebes, I believe, granted that the soul is more lasting than the body, but said that no one could know that the soul, after wearing out many bodies, did not at last perish itself upon leaving the body; and that this was death – the destruction of the soul, since the body is continually being destroyed.  Are those the points, Simmias and Cebes, which we must consider?’

“They both agreed that these were the points.

“’Now,’ said he, ‘do you reject all of our previous arguments, or only some of them?’

“’Only some of them,’ they replied.

“’What do you think,’ he asked, ‘about the argument in which we said that learning is recollection and that, since this is so, our soul must necessarily have been somewhere before it was imprisoned in the body?’

“’I,’ said Cebes, ‘was wonderfully convinced by it at the time and I still believe it more firmly than any other argument.’

“’And I too,’ said Simmias, ’feel just as he does, and I should be much surprised if I should ever think differently on this point.’

“And Socrates said: ‘You must, my Theban friend, think differently, if you persist in your opinion that a harmony is a compound and that the soul is a harmony made up of the elements that are strung like harpstrings in the body.  For surely you will not accept your own statement that a composite harmony existed before those things from which it had to be composed, will you?’

“’Certainly not, Socrates.’

“’Then do you see,’ said he, ‘that this is just what you say when you assert that the soul exists before it enters into the form and body of a man, and that it is composed of things that do not yet exist?  For harmony is not what your comparison assumes it to be.  The lyre and the strings and the sounds come into being in a tuneless condition, and the harmony is the last of all to be composed and the first to perish.  So how can you bring this theory into harmony with the other?’

“’I cannot at all,’ said Simmias.

“’And yet,’ said Socrates, ‘there ought to be harmony between it and the theory about harmony above all others.’

“’Yes, there ought,’ said Simmias.

“’Well,’ said he, ‘there is no harmony between the two theories.  Now which do you prefer, that knowledge is recollection or that the soul is a harmony?’

“’The former, decidedly, Socrates,’ he replied.  ‘For this other came to me without demonstration; it merely seemed probably and attractive, which is the reason why many men hold it.  I am conscious that those arguments which base their demonstrations on mere probability are deceptive, and if we are not on our guard against them they deceive us greatly, in geometry and in all other things.  But the theory of recollection and knowledge has been established by a sound course of argument.  For we agreed that our soul before it entered into the body existed just as the very essence which is called the absolute exists.  Now I am persuaded that I have accepted this essence on sufficient and right grounds.  I cannot therefore accept from myself or anyone else the statement that the soul is a harmony.’

“’Here is another way of looking at it, Simmias,’ said he.  ‘Do you think a harmony or any other composite thing can be in any other state than that in which the elements are of which it is composed?’

“’Certainly not.’

“’And it can neither do nor suffer anything other than they do or suffer?’

“He agreed.

“’Then a harmony cannot be expected to lead the elements of which it is composed, but to follow them.’

“He assented.

“’A harmony, then, is quite unable to move or make a sound or do anything else that is opposed to its component parts.’

“’Quite unable,’ said he.

“’Well, then is not every harmony by nature a harmony according as it is harmonized?’

“’I do not understand,’ said Simmias.

“’Would it not,’ said Socrates, ‘be more completely a harmony and a greater harmony if it were harmonized more fully and to a greater extent, assuming that to be possible, and less completely a harmony and a lesser harmony if less completely harmonized and to a less extent?’

“’Certainly.’

“’Is this true of the soul?  Is one soul even in the slightest degree more completely and to a greater extent a soul than another, or less completely and to a less extent?’

“’Not in the least,’ said he.

“’Well now, said he, one soul is said to possess sense and virtue and to be good, and another to possess folly and wickedness and to be bad; and is this true?’

“’Yes, it is true.’

“’Now what will those who assume that the soul is a harmony say that these things – the virtue and the wickedness – in the soul are?  Will they say that this is another kind of harmony and a discord, and that the soul, which is itself a harmony, has within it another harmony and that the other soul is discordant and has no other harmony within it?’

“’I cannot tell,’ replied Simmias, ‘but evidently those who make that assumption would say something of that sort.’

“’But we agreed, said Socrates, ‘that oen soul is no more or less a soul than another; and that is equivalent to an agreement that one is no more and to no greater extent, and no less and to no less extent, a harmony than another, is it not?’

“’Certainly.’

“’And that which is not more or less a harmony, is no more or less harmonized.  Is that so?’

“’Yes.’

“’But has that which is no more and no less harmonized any greater or any less amount of harmony, or an equal amount?’

“’An equal amount.’

“’Then a soul, since it is neither more nor less a soul than another, is neither more nor less harmonized.’

“’That is so.’

“’And therefore can have no greater amount of discord or of harmony?’

“’No.’

“’And therefore again one soul can have no greater amount of wickedness or virtue than another, if wickedness is discord and virtue harmony?’

“’It cannot.’

“’Or rather, to speak exactly, Simmias, no soul will have any wickedness at all, if the soul is a harmony; for if a harmony is entirely harmony, it could have no part in discord.’

“’Certainly not.’

“’Then the soul, being entirely soul, could have no part in wickedness.’

“’How could it, if what we have said is right?’

“’According to this argument, then, if all souls are by nature equally souls, all souls of all living creatures will be equally good.’

“’So it seems, Socrates,’ said he.

“’And,’ said Socrates, ‘do you think that this is true and that our reasoning would have come to this end, if the theory that the soul is a harmony were correct?’

“’Not in the least,’ he replied.

“’Well,’ said Socrates, ‘of all the parts that make up a man, do you think any is ruler except the soul, especially if it be a wise one?’

“’No, I do not.’

“’Does it yield to the feelings of the body or oppose them.  I mean, when the body is hot and thirsty, does not the soul oppose it and draw it away from drinking, and from eating when it is hungry, and do we not see the soul opposing the body in countless other ways?’

“’Certainly.’

“’Did we not agree in our previous discussion that it could never, if it be a harmony, give forth a sound at variance with the tensions and relaxations and vibrations and other conditions of the elements which compose it, but that it would follow them and never lead them?’

“’Yes,’ he replied, ‘we did, of course.’

“’Well then, do we not now find that the soul acts in exactly the opposite way, leading those elements of which it is said to consist and opposing them in almost everything through all our life, and tyrannizing over them in every way, sometimes inflicting harsh and painful punishments (those of gymnastics and medicine), and sometimes milder ones, sometimes threatening and sometimes admonishing, in short, speaking to the desires and passions and fears as if it were distinct from them and they from it, as Homer has shown in the Odyssey when he says of Odysseus: 

            He smote his breast, and thus he chid his heart:

            “Endure it, heart, thou didst bear worse than this”?

            (Footnote: Odyssey xx, 17, 18, Bryant’s translation.)

Do you suppose that, when he wrote those words, he thought of the soul as a harmony which would be led by the conditions of the body, and not rather as something fitted to lead and rule them, and itself a far more divine thing than a harmony?’

“’By Zeus, Socrates, the latter, I think.’

“’Then, my good friend, it will never do for us to say that the soul is a harmony; for we should, it seems, agree neither with Homer, the divine poet, nor with ourselves.’

“’That is true,’ said he.”

(Ibid, Fowler, pages 315 – 327, 91C-95A)

1.  It feels to me like Socrates has taken a focused and serious turn in this section.  Perhaps Socrates has become a bit exasperated and wants to bring the discussion to some kind of conclusion.

2.  The exchange in this section is focused on two arguments that represent two contrasting views of the soul; the first is the idea that the soul is a harmony of parts.  The lyre is used as an analogy to anchor this view of soul.  The second is the teaching that learning is recollection and that the soul is the vehicle for recollection; this implies that the soul does not consist of parts and is not a harmony.  Instead the soul is depicted in this argument as having a certain function; that function is that soul is the vehicle that provides a sense of continuity throughout a single life as well as from life to life.  That continuity is revealed through recollection.

3.  Beneath the recollection argument is the understanding of the cyclic nature of the third hypostasis, or material existence.  The World Soul is the progenitor of cyclic existence, aided by number.  The individual soul participates in this cyclic world of becoming and begoning, but begins to transcend becoming and begoning through recollection of experiences in higher hypostases that occur between lives.

4.  As I understand the critique Socrates offers of the soul as a harmony, it is based on the idea that harmony is an emergent quality of the parts of the lyre being put together properly.  The harmony of a lyre is causally dependent upon the parts of the lyre so that the harmony has no self-sufficiency.

5.  Socrates systematically draws out the implications of the view that the soul is a harmony for Simmias, pushing Simmias to consider these implications.  These include the idea that the soul could have no part in wickedness, and that all souls would be equally good.  Socrates concludes this series of pointed questions with, “. . . do you think that this is true and that our reasoning would have come to this end, if the theory that the soul is a harmony were correct?”  And Simmias responds, “Not in the least,” meaning that the consequences of the harmony theory of the soul are ‘not in the least true.’

6.  All that is good in material existence comes from the Good, the ultimately transcendental.  Human beings who are fixated on material existence abandon the Good and become, by that fixation on materiality, inclined to engage in various negative acts of which there are a depressing wide range and large number from petty ethical faults to behavior that is starkly evil.  When human beings turn to the soul, they discover the source of that which is good in life, that which guides us to do good, which is found in its purity in the Good and the One of the first hypostasis.  But constant contact with materiality, and allowing material desires to govern our activity, can alter the soul so that instead of the soul being a guide to the Good, it becomes the facilitator of desires, turning the soul into something ‘wicked.’

As Socrates says, “Does it (the soul) yield to the feelings of the body or oppose them?”  In a way we could say that the question for the Platonist is ‘Who is in charge of my life?  Is it the body who is in charge, or is it the soul who is in charge?’  The body should be the servant of the soul (as Socrates says, the soul is a kind of ‘ruler’).  But for many people it is the body who is the ruler and the soul has become a servant; or perhaps more accurately, the soul is in a kind of sleep.

7.  What is the nature of the connection between the individual soul and the Good?  Because the Good is beyond name and form, beyond affirmation and negation, it is not easy to illuminate this topic.  I think only analogies, metaphors, similes, and allegories work in this context.  There are classic analogies that are useful; one of these is how the light of the moon is reflected in countless bodies of water, from a pond to a drop of rain.  In this analogy the soul resembles a body of water that absorbs the light of the Good, reflects the light of the Good, in a manner that makes a good life accessible to human beings.

Another analogy is how rain will nourish all living things, falling upon the just and the unjust alike.  In this analogy the soul is that which is nourished by the good rain falling upon it.

The soul is like an ancient, or better, eternal book that lies within the heart and mind of every human being.  It is the same book for everyone.  When we are distracted by material appearances, the book is closed.  When we turn to this book, and begin to read its pages, we recollect, through the book’s instructions, our transcendental home and we come in touch with the possibility of living a life based on the Good.

8.  Socrates instructs us on the nature of the soul by emphasizing how the soul consistently opposes the tendency of the body to indulge in materiality.  For Socrates, it is the soul that acts as a guide reminding us not to indulge in material excesses.  It is the soul that curtails what we might today call ‘addictive’ behavior that we intellectually know is harmful, but that we cannot control by relying on material causes and conditions.  It is only through the soul, because of its association with the Good, that we can break free of those kinds of behaviors.

9.  As an aside, I think this section of Phaedo is another example of the intimate connection between the soul and the higher hypostases such as Mind/Intellect and the Good.  In terms of developments in late classical Platonism, which appeared after Plotinus and Porphyry, and their view that the soul has no direct access to higher hypostases, passages like this, I think, strongly undermine that view.

10.  The section concludes with Socrates stating that the soul is ‘divine’.  The divine nature of the soul is its everpresent connection with the Good and the One.  And it is this connection that provides human beings with the means for transcending this world of cyclic sorrow. 

Socrates further states that the soul is a kind of ‘ruler’ that is fit to lead us to that which is divine.  This kind of relationship develops over time, I think.  It takes time because we have developed the habit of acquiescing to the demands and inclinations of the body and of material ‘satisfaction.’  In a way you could see the soul as being like a muscle that has atrophied so that when we first use it, it is not very effective.  

My observation is that when people make their first conscious contact with the soul it can be more than a little baffling; I mean that people often don’t know what to do with such an experience.  This is because they are unfamiliar with it.  But trust builds up over time, and the soul has eternity to perform its task and function.  As one becomes more familiar with the soul, which is accomplished through ascesis, purifications, and especially contemplation, our sense of trust in what the soul has to offer takes root and finally becomes stable.  We recognize the soul’s light in every body of water, we discover the source of this light in the moon, and eventually we move to the source of the light of the moon; the sun of wisdom and eternity, the true peace of the One, the Good and the Beautiful.