Brief Notes on Various Topics -- 3

8 February 2024

Brief Notes on Various Topics – 3

1.  An interesting aspect of Mystical Monotheism by John Peter Kenney is that when seeking to understand the thought of Plotinus, Kenney contrasts the way Plotinus unpacks central Platonic views with the way the predecessors of Plotinus do so.  The way Kenney does this is by referring to the chronologically early Enneads with the idea that in these essays Plotinus would distinguish his views from his predecessors.  Kenney writes, “I propose taking advantage of our knowledge of the chronology of the writings and concentrating attention upon the earlier works, which clarify the grounds for Plotinus’s break with Middle Platonism . . . Within the earlier works, the novelty of his position seems to have required that Plotinus clarify his views over against the Middle Platonic school traditions and it is these treatises that I will be considering in some detail, especially V.9 (5), V4 (7), VI.9 (9), V.1 (10), V.2 (11), and III.9 (13).” [Note: the number in parentheses is the chronological number for the Ennead.  This means that the six Enneads Kenney is focusing on were among the first 13 Plotinus wrote.]

(John Peter Kenney, Mystical Monotheism, Wipf and Stock Publishers, Eugene, Oregon, 1991, pages 92 and 93, ISBN: 97810610970099)

This is the first time that a Plotinus scholar I have read presents a case for reading the Enneads in chronological order instead of the topical order brought to us by Porphyry.  It’s not that Kenney is making that argument explicitly; he doesn’t bring that up.  Rather Kenney is demonstrating that at least in this one case the chronological order was revealing of how Plotinus developed his Platonic views.

2.  The mind (small ‘m’ mind) is never satisfied.  It is perpetually restless.  This is why contemplation is difficult; because such contemplation sidelines the conceptual, or analytical, small ‘m’ mind.  For the Platonist practitioner this should be taken to heart.  There will never be a perfect presentation of Platonic metaphysics that cannot be improved, modified, elaborated, or simplified.  (The same applies to all other systems of thought.)  A good, general, understanding of Platonic metaphysics is necessary and sufficient.  Such general knowledge provides a good basis for contemplation and transcending the small ‘m’ mind.

3.  It has been my observation that Westerners have a deep resentment of ethical precepts; they don’t like being told what to do or how to behave.  I observed this during my Buddhist period.  It was very rare that I met someone who took the precepts seriously by, for example, refraining from alcohol.  The same resentment and resistance are observable among contemporary Platonists; the teachings of ascetic restraint are, for the most part, sidelined in favor of a kind of intellectual development that is disconnected from Platonist precepts, as if the two had nothing to do with each other.

4.  There is a section in Ennead II.4, On Matter where Plotinus is critiquing those who deny the existence of matter: “If we do deny the existence of matter we shall by the same argument be prevented from asserting the existence of qualities and size; for everything of this kind could be said to be nothing taken alone by itself.” [According to Armstrong, Plotinus is likely disputing with Aristotle.] (Plotinus, Ennead II.4, translated by A. H. Armstrong, Loeb Classical Library, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1966, page 137, ISBN: 9780674994867)

I have to admit that I’m one of those who leans towards the view of denying the existence of matter; I’m more of an idealist.  This is a common experience when reading Platonic literature, I mean coming across passages that you don’t agree with.  I think it is almost inevitable.  I think it is important not to become agitated about this.  One way to do this is to develop an intimate relationship with these works; this intimacy turns them into good friends.  We don’t expect our friends to agree with us on everything, or even most things.  Friendship is deeper than agreeing on a long list of topics.  A true friend allows us to disagree with that friend’s view because of the depth of the relationship.  Plato and Plotinus are more than friends, of course, but what I’m getting at is cultivating equanimity when disagreements arise and continuing the cultivation of the relationship.  When this is done several things can happen: I might discover I was wrong (which is what has happened most often with me), I might continue with the view I have, but that doesn’t disrupt the connection, or third, some other possibility might arise that neither of us thought of previously; there is something almost magical when that happens.

5.  If I were to express the nature of The One and The Good, I would say it is ‘clear like space.’ 

Plotinus and his Nuanced Unpacking of the Nature of Evil

4 February 2024

Plotinus and his Nuanced Unpacking of the Nature of Evil

“Then are the evils in the All necessary, because they follow on the prior realities?  Rather because if they did not exist the All would be imperfect.  Most of them, even all of them, contribute something useful to the Whole – poisonous snakes do, for instance – though generally the reason why remains obscure.  Even moral evil itself has many advantages and is productive of much excellence, for example, all the beauty of art, and rouses us to serious thought about our way of living, not allowing us to slumber complacently.  If this is correct, it must be that the Soul of the All contemplates the best, always aspiring to the intelligible nature and to God, and that when it is full, filled right up to the brim, its trace, its last and lowest expression, is this productive principle that we are discussing.  This, then, is the ultimate maker; over it is the part of soul which is primarily filled from Intellect: over all is Intellect the Craftsman, who gives to the soul which comes next those gifts whose traces are in the third.  This visible universe, then, is properly called an image always in process of being made; its first and second principles are at rest, the third at rest too, but also in motion, incidentally and in matter.  As long as Intellect and Soul exist, the forming principles will flow into this lower form of soul, just as, as long as the sun exists, all its rays will shine from it.”

(Plotinus, Ennead II.3.18, On Whether the Stars are Causes, translated by A. H. Armstrong, Plotinus: Ennead II, Loeb Classical Library, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1966, page 101, ISBN: 9780674994867)

“Are the evils in the Universe necessary because it is of later origin than the Higher Sphere?

“Perhaps rather because without evil the All would be incomplete.  For most or even all forms of evil serve the Universe – much as the poisonous snake has its use – though in most cases their function is unknown.  Vice itself has many useful sides: it brings about much that is beautiful, in artistic creations for example, and its stirs us to thoughtful living, not allowing us to drowse in security.

“If all this is so, then (the secret of creation is that) the Soul of the All abides in contemplation of the Highest and Best, ceaselessly striving towards the Intelligible Kind and towards God: but, thus absorbing and filled full, it overflows, so to speak – and the image it gives forth, its last utterance towards the lower, will be the creative puissance.

“This, then, is the ultimate Maker, secondary to that aspect of the Soul which is primarily saturated from the Divine Intelligence.  But the Creator above all is the Intellectual-Principle, as giver, to the Soul that follows it, of those gifts whose traces exist in the Third Kind.

Rightly, therefore, is this Cosmos described as an image continuously being imaged, the First and the Second Principles immobile, the Third too, immobile essentially, but, accidentally and in Matter, having motion.

“For as long as divine Mind and Soul exist, the divine Thought-Forms (Reason-Principes) will pour forth into that phase of the Soul: as long as there is a sun, all that streams from it will be some form of Light.”

(Plotinus, Ennead II.3.18, translated by Stephen MacKenna, Larson Publications, Burdett, New York, 1992, pages 117 & 118, ISBN: 9780943914558)

1.  This is the last section, or paragraph (depending on the translator), of this Ennead.  The topic of the Ennead is astrology; specifically whether or not the causal mechanism that astrologers at that time gave for how astrology works makes sense.  Plotinus offers a nuanced analysis; Plotinus does not dismiss astrology entirely but calls into question some of its claims.  As I understand it, Plotinus argues that astrology works, when it does work, in the same way that other types of augury work, such as observing the flight of birds, and so forth.  In paragraph 14 Plotinus writes, “. . . all things without exception are connected with each other; so everything without exception is indicated (Ibid, Armstrong, page 89).”  In other words, if you know how to read the flight of birds you can read such flight for what is ‘indicated’ in response to a question.  And you can read the stars for what is indicated.

2.  The question of negativities and evil appear in this context in a natural way, because astrology claims to be able to predict if someone will have tendencies to evil, or be victimized by evil, or if the opposite will be the case.  Plotinus is skeptical of assertions like this.  Interestingly, his skepticism seems to be rooted in the observation that we do not always know, ultimately, if something that happens to us, or something that we do, is negative or positive.  (This relates back to the Taoist story I mentioned in my previous post on evil (posted 29 January 2024, the third comment.))  I think this quote expands what Plotinus has to say about evil beyond what is said in the Theaetetus.

3.  “Then are the evils in the All necessary, because they follow on the prior realities?  Rather because if they did not exist the All would be imperfect.”

MacKenna translates using the word ‘incomplete’ rather than ‘imperfect.’  The implication here is that the existence of evil in the material world is an expression of the perfection of the All (or as MacKenna translates, the Universe.)  This is difficult to grasp or accept.  I think the mind resists such a view.  It resists such a view because we instinctively want to rid the cosmos of evil.  But Plato says in Theaetetus that his is not possible and Plotinus is here suggesting that it is not possible because evil is a necessary expression of perfection, but that we misunderstand this.  I believe this view is based on a deep acceptance of the cosmos and, I suspect, it is also rooted in Plotinus’s deep awareness of beauty.

I suspect that this is one of these teachings that is understood through intuition and contemplation, but that remains hidden from rational, meaning logical, analysis.

4.  “Most of them [evils], even all of them, contribute something useful to the Whole – poisonous snakes do, for instance, though generally the reason why remains obscure.”

I like the way Plotinus is a bit hesitant in his assertion; first he says ‘most of them,’ which is then followed by ‘even all of them.’  This indicates to me that he is ‘thinking out loud,’ or speculating about this problem, using his considerable intellect to unpack the meanings and implications of the presence of evil in our world.

It’s interesting to me that the example of evil Plotinus offers is poisonous snakes.  Personally, I don’t think of poisonous snakes as evil.  In the same way I don’t think of natural disasters as evil.  But it seems to be the case that, at least at one level, Plotinus is equating destructive or disintegrative forces, even if they are completely natural, as evil.  It’s not clear to me if Plotinus would distinguish between a murderer and a poisonous snake if the poisonous was fatal.  From one perspective I can see equating the two because it places both humans and snakes on an equal footing; meaning they are both creatures that ‘follow on prior realities.’  But I think there is a tendency to regard a human murderer as having greater ethical agency, having free will, and thinking that snakes do not have ethical agency or free will, or at least not to the degree that humans do.  This is leading to murky waters and I have to cut it short; but I just wanted to point to some of the complexities this kind of analysis gives rise to.  And, as we see, Plotinus touches on some of these in the next sentence.

5.  “Even moral evil itself has many advantages and is productive of much excellence, for example, all the beauty of art, and rouses us to serious thought about our way of living, not allowing us to slumber complacently.”

Plotinus is distinguishing ‘moral evil,’ what MacKenna translates as ‘vice,’ from the evil of a poisonous snake.  Moral evil is, I think, something that belongs to humans and gods, but likely is not a part of the realm of other living things. 

In a footnote to this sentence Armstrong writes, “Is Plotinus thinking here, perhaps, of tragic poetry?  If so, the argument shows a startling reversal of Plato’s standpoint.  Plato in Republic II refused to allow poets to portray moral evil; Plotinus here seems to be justifying the existence of moral evil in the universe because it produces art.”  Plotinus thought of himself as a loyal, and dedicated, interpreter of Plato; because of this I have to think a bit about Armstrong’s remarks.  The first thing I can think of is that Plato wanted to shield children from depictions of moral evil; I don’t think it was a general prohibition, which Armstrong implies.  If I’m correct, shielding children from tales of betrayal and murder is likely a good thing, as such tales would be difficult for children to interpret because they lack the life experience that would place such tales in context.

6.  One of the things that the presence of evil in the cosmos teaches us that this realm in which we live is deeply troubled.  It is for this reason that Plotinus at this point shifts the discussion to the divine ascent, detailing the levels of the cosmos.  Plotinus says there are ‘traces’ of the divine in the ‘third’; by the ‘third’ Plotinus means the material domain.  He is saying that even in the material domain we can perceive traces of the divine which is the source of the material domain.

7.  “This visible [sensory] universe, then, is properly called an image always in process of being made; its first and second principles are at rest, the third at rest too, but also in motion, incidentally and in matter.”

The material world is an image of the noetic, and beyond the noetic, the transcendental.  Both of these are ‘at rest,’ meaning in perfect stillness.  Surprising, Plotinus adds that the ‘third,’ meaning the material realm, is ‘at rest too’ but it is ‘also in motion.’ 

In Platonism there is a distinction between the eternal and the everlasting.  The eternal is timeless; it is essentially, not ‘incidentally’ at rest.  The everlasting endures throughout all time but is a part of time; this is why our cosmos is cyclic.  This cyclic nature of our cosmos is ever lasting but ‘also in motion.’  The everlasting is the way that matter imitates the eternal.

8.  “As long as Intellect and Soul exist, the forming principles will flow into this lower form of soul, just as, as long as the sun exists, all its rays will shine from it.”

This is a beautiful conclusion to this Ennead.  ‘Intellect’ refers to Noetic Mind.  ‘Soul,’ with a capital ‘S’ refers to the world soul which transcends our individual souls that are more differentiated than the world soul.  Intellect overflows into the World Soul, and the World Soul overflows into out individual souls; in each case this overflowing happens like the rays of the light of the sun overflowing into space and generating all life on earth.

Addendum – 5 February 2024

“EVILS ARE NECESSARY TO THE PERFECTION OF THE UNIVERSE

“Must the evils in the universe be considered as necessary, because they are the consequences of the superior principles?  Yes, for without them the universe would be imperfect.  The greater number of evils, if not all of them, are useful to the universe; such as the venomous animals; though they often ignore their real utility.  Even wickedness is useful in certain respects, and can produce many beautiful things; for example, it leads to fine inventions, it forces men to prudence, and does not let them fall asleep in an indolent security.

“PICTURE OF THE STRUCTURE OF THE UNIVERSE

“Under these circumstances, it is plain that the universal Soul ever contemplates the better principles, because it is turned towards the intelligible world, and towards the divinity.  As she fills herself with God, and is filled with God, she, as it were overflows over her image, namely the power which holds the last rank (the natural generative power), and which, consequently, is the last creative power.  Above this creative power is the power of the Soul which immediately receives the forms from the Intelligence.  Above all is the Intelligence, the Demiurge, who gives the forms to the universal Soul, and the latter impresses its traces on the third-rank power (the natural generative power).  This world, therefore, is veritably a picture which perpetually pictures itself.  The two first principles are immovable; the third is also immovable (in essence); but it is engaged in matter, and becomes immovable (only) by accident.  As long as the Intelligence and the Soul subsist, the ‘reasons’ flow down into this image of the Soul (the natural generative power); likewise, so long as the sun subsists, all light emanates therefrom.”

(Plotinus, Complete Works, translated by Kenneth Sylvan Guthrie, First Edition 1918, Reprinted with New Formatting 2017, Kshetra Books, No Location Given, pages 613 & 614, ISBN: 9781974518968)

1.  I decided to add the Guthrie translation of this part of the Ennead on whether or not the stars are causes.  Guthrie is, for the most part, left out when there are discussions about translations.  My understanding is that Guthrie lacked a competent Greek text from which to work; at least that is what I read here and there.

2.  Guthrie added section titles; those aren’t part of the original text.  Guthrie’s section titles are a bit like an outline of the Enneads.

3.  Guthrie uses the phrase “venomous animals” rather than “poisonous snakes.”  According to a friend, who reads Classical Greek, the word ‘snakes’ is not in the Greek; perhaps venomous animals is a more literal translation.

4.  On the other hand, Guthrie uses the term “Demiurge” where Armstrong uses “the Soul of All”; I did not find the word “Demiurge” in the Greek when I went over it quickly (I can, very slowly, read a tiny bit of Greek now, but I often miss things.)  The Demiurge, from the Timaeus features prominently in a number of Platonic Sages’ writings; but in Plotinus there is not a lot said about the Demiurge; it’s not entirely absent but the Demiurge does not have the prominence that others give it.  For a discussion about this I recommend Mystical Monotheism by John Peter Kenney who discusses the way Plotinus ‘demotes’ the Demiurge in the Enneads, beginning on page 97.

5.  I like comparing translations.  All of the translators of the complete Enneads were dedicated scholars with a deep admiration for Plotinus.  They were sincere in their admiration for Plotinus.  And I’m very grateful for the time and energy they put into bringing the wisdom of Plotinus into the English language.

Brief Notes on Various Topics -- 2

3 February 2024

Brief Notes on Various Topics – 2

1.  I began my reading of the Enneads of Plotinus in January.  This is a yearly practice for me, as I have mentioned before.  This year, though, I have found myself more at ease with the style of his writing.  Before I would refer to Plotinus as a ‘difficult’ author.  But this time I feel at ease with his mode of discourse; I would almost call it ‘friendly.’  I think this is a teaching in the way repetition can sometimes bring clarity and insight. 

2.  The more I read Plotinus, along with relevant scholarly material about Plotinus, the more I think that Plotinus is the pinnacle of the Platonist tradition.  I’m not saying that other Saints and Sages of the Platonist tradition do not speak to me or that I don’t learn from them; for example, I have a fondness for Plutarch and many others.  But Plotinus is exceptional and I don’t know of any other writer in the Platonist tradition (other than Plato, of course) who matches his skill, clarity, insight, wisdom, understanding, and knowledge. 

3.  It’s possible to view asceticism as a craft that has a set of skills to practice.  I think people tend to view asceticism in an all or nothing way rather than as something that grows over time.  For example, refraining from alcohol can be accomplished over time.  Someone might start out by refraining from drinking during the week, only indulging on weekends.  Or they might confine their alcohol consumption to a single drink in the evening and thereby reduce their consumption.  Over time this kind of commitment can grow until the practitioner ends up not consuming alcohol at all.  The same can be applied to other ascetic practices such as restraining sexual desire and refraining from eating or using animal products.  When looked at in this way, I think the Ascetic Way becomes more accessible.

4.  It is natural that disagreements about doctrine arise in a spiritual tradition.  We live in the realm of differentiation, very far from the unity found in the noetic realm, and unimaginably distant from the unity of the One.  Platonism is no exception.  But it is not necessary to understand all the nuances around doctrinal disputes in order to practice Platonism.  To begin Platonist practice you just need a general sense of the metaphysical cosmos as Platonism sees it.  To begin Platonist practice you need to find Platonist writings attractive and worth reading; a kind of intuition that there is profundity within them.  And to begin Platonist practice you need to be motivated enough to take the first steps on the Ascetic Way.

5.  I was a Buddhist monastic for about six years.  That was many decades ago.  But even though I returned my monastic precepts, meaning I returned to lay life, I retained a positive feeling for the monastic calling.  I have a friend who describes himself as a ‘Platonist Monk.’  I like the term.  I haven’t found it in the writings of Platonism, but I have encountered its spirit in those writings.  I think it is a good term for a certain type of Platonist; namely someone who takes the ascetic teachings of Platonism seriously and does their best to embody these teachings in their daily life. 

 

 

Platonism as a Type of Monotheism

31 January 2024

Platonism as a Type of Monotheism

I have been reading Mystical Monotheism: A Study in Ancient Platonic Theology, by John Peter Kenney.  Kenney’s purpose is to illuminate the development of monotheism within the Platonic tradition and to see that this development has shaped how the West understands monotheism.  I think the book is very well written, though it is definitely an academic book.  By ‘academic’ I mean that the audience the author was writing for was other academics; I can tell this by the kind of vocabulary he uses and certain ways that academics shape their sentences.  That’s not a criticism; I enjoy academic writing.  But it helps in understanding a book to know who the book was written for.

Here are a few remarks about Mystical Monotheism:

1.  This book is a good counterbalance to the books that view Platonism as an essentially Pagan tradition; there are quite a few of these at this time.  Kenney did not write his book in order to argue against a Pagan interpretation of Platonism; but if you are familiar with contemporary Pagan thought, and its interactions with Platonism, the book will automatically challenge that point of view.

2.  Kenney writes in his Preface, “This is an essay in philosophical theology and its history.  It is the initial study in a broader inquiry into the foundations of Western monotheism and represents an effort to reflect anew upon our theistic patrimony. . . The proximate focus of this study is the development of philosophical monotheism from the late Hellenistic period through the death of Plotinus in 270 A.D., the period of its initial coalescence.”  (Page IX)

It is Kenney’s view that the development of monotheism in the context of the history of Platonism has informed, guided, and shaped Western monotheism overall.  However, Kenney has the view that this formative influence has been ‘neglected.’  Partly this is because scholars of religion tend to start their investigations with the Reformation; this makes sense because almost all the topics of concern to Western religion at this time were either definitively shaped by the Reformation, or got their start in the Reformation.  The consequence of this is that the foundational insights and understanding of Ancient monotheism, such as that found in Platonism, are no longer examined and their contributions are, with some exceptions, not understood.  Kenney hopes to broaden the historical scope of monotheism so that it will include ancient Platonism and its historical unfolding in the Classical world.

3.  It strikes me when reading this work that Kenney is broadening the meaning of monotheism beyond what is usually the case.  I think most people think of ‘monotheism’ to refer to Judaism, Christianity, and Islam (with occasional nods to Mormons and Bahai and so forth.)  Philosophical monotheism, the term Kenney uses, is not often brought into the picture (though I seem to recall that Karen Armstrong talks a little bit about it in her A History of God.)  There are Christian philosophers but philosophical monotheism that is prior to Jewish and Christian influences is not usually part of the picture.  Kenney is, I think, attempting to reinstate this kind of monotheism and bring it into the discussion about monotheism overall.

4.  Kenney writes that monotheism “is defined simply as the thesis that there is an ultimate divine principle transcendent to the physical universe.” (Page xxiv)  Looked at in this way, Platonism would qualify as a type of monotheism because of the principle of The One which is the source of all things and is, at the same time, transcendentally Good. 

I suspect that many contemporary Platonists would not consider this to be sufficient for viewing Platonism as a monotheistic tradition.  The definition might be considered too abstract in that it ignores many metaphysical assumptions (such as that of creation) as well as communal, ethical, and ritual commitments.  Looked at in this way Platonism might be seen as very different from, or even opposed to, the three dominant forms of monotheism of Judaism, Christianity, and Islam.  On the other hand, Platonism and these three monotheistic traditions have had a very long history of interacting with each other and finding nourishment for their own theologies in Platonic contexts.

I guess it would depend on where you want to draw lines of distinction and difference.

5.  For me one of the most helpful aspects of Mystical Monotheism has been the way Kenney presents the history of Platonic thought by focusing on the development of ways of interpreting the structure of the levels (hypostases) of existence.  Some early Platonists have viewed Platonic forms as ideas in the mind of God who is the first and highest level.  This means that The One would have conceptual content as opposed to the later development of a mystical understanding of The One as beyond intellect, analysis, affirmation and negation. 

Kenney also focuses on varying views of the nature and function of the Demiurge which I found fascinating.  Kenney’s view is that eventually the Platonic tradition would ‘displace’ the Demiurge; for example, it doesn’t seem that Plotinus has very much to say about this idea.

These shifting interpretations of the nature of the levels of reality (hypostases), of the historical unfolding of Platonic philosophy, was like reading about a great Symposium that has lasted for many centuries.  I had a kind of vision of a gathering of Platonic Sages, people like Xenocrates, Plutarch, Alcinous, Plotinus, Porphyry, Boethius, Ficino, the Cambridge Platonists, and so forth to the present, taking their turn giving speeches about the Platonic Way.  There they are, all of them, sitting on couches, relaxed with each other, discussing the best way to communicate the actuality of the cosmos and the presence of eternity to others.  I find this vision inspiring.

6.  Kenney concludes his book with a chapter on Plotinus.  Kenney refers to the Enneads as a ‘charter for later Hellenic monotheism.’  (Page 151)  Kenney notes that Plotinian monotheism was ‘arrived at through a different conceptual strategy than in the Abrahamic tradition.’ (Page 152) 

Kenney also writes that ‘Despite its temporary success in late antiquity, the Hellenic monotheism of the Neoplatonists was a tradition lost but for its subsequent absorption into the Abrahamic theological world.’  (Page 156)  I think this is true.  It is only very recently that the thought of Plotinus has been viewed as sufficient and complete unto itself.  In my own case, this is because I was able to view Platonism as a whole, and Plotinus specifically, through what I think of as a ‘Dharmic’ lens.  This happened due to my decades long study of Buddhism in particular, and other Dharmic traditions as they interacted with Buddhism.  It isn’t that I think of Platonism as a Buddhist Sect; it has more to do with relating to Platonism as more closely resembling what is expected from Dharmic traditions.  Kenney doesn’t mention this kind of relationship as that is not the purpose of his book (and it seems to me that he has no interest in Dharmic traditions.)  But viewing Platonism as a type of Dharma allows for the possibility of understanding Platonism as a complete spiritual path and I think that is something we can look forward to.

 

 

Thinking about the Nature of Evil in Platonist Analysis

29 January 2024

Thinking about the Nature of Evil in Platonist Analysis

In my previous post I quoted from Theaetetus.  The conclusion of what I quoted shifts focus from the life of an exemplary philosopher to a brief discussion about evil:

Theodorus:  “’If, Socrates, you could persuade all men of the truth of what you say as you do me, there would be more peace and fewer evils among mankind.’

Socrates:  “’But it is impossible that evils should be done away with, Theodorus, for there must always be something opposed to the good; and they cannot have their place among the gods, but must inevitably hover about mortal nature and this earth.’”

(Plato, Theaetetus, translated by Harold North Fowlers, Theaetetus, Sophist, Loeb Classical Library, Harvard University Press, Cambridge Massachusetts, page 127, 176A, ISBN: 0674991370)

At the same time, I was reading Ennead I.8, On What Are Evils.  At places in this Ennead Plotinus seems to say that matter is the source of evil.  But Plotinus also suggests that matter is non-existent, or nearly so:

“The whole world of sense is non-existent in this way, and also all sense-experience and whatever is posterior or incidental to this, or its principle, or one of the elements which go to make up the whole which is of this non-existent kind.”

(Plotinus, Ennead I.8, On What are Evils, translated by A. H. Armstrong, Loeb Classical Library, Harvard University Press, Cambridge Massachusetts, 1966, page 283, ISBN: 9780674994843)

The question of the nature of evil in Platonism is complicated and difficult.  It is not always clear to me how Platonist Sages understand evil.  And later Platonists, following Plotinus, added further complications.  Here are a few comments on this topic:

1.  I see the connection between the quote from Theaetetus and the quote from Ennead I.8 as that both view evil as something that arises in material or earthly existence, as an inevitable consequence of that level of existence.  Plato writes that evil “must inevitably hover about mortal nature and this earth.”  Plotinus writes that the whole world of sense experience, which is the realm of ‘mortal nature and this earth’ is of a ‘non-existent kind,’ implying that evil is the result of a degree of non-existence.  Noetic realities actually exist, but sensory things only exist to a degree; the farther they are from noetic realities the less ‘existent’ they are.  From this perspective evil is a lack of ‘being.’  Pure evil would be complete non-being which, at times, Plotinus seems to suggest is matter.  And non-being is found in the realm of mortal nature, the realm of becoming and begoning.

2.  This is not easy to follow.  The struggle that Platonists face is reconciling ultimate nature as the Good with the presence of evil in the material realm.  If material things exist as emanations of the Good, then how does evil appear, what mechanism accounts for its presence?

3.  There is an old Taoist tale about this topic.  A farmer purchases a horse using almost all of his money to do so.  The farmer’s son trains the horse but is thrown by the horse and breaks his leg.  Neighbors of the farmer express their sympathy to the former over the farmer’s misfortune.  The farmer shrugs and says, “Maybe so.”

The next week, government officials come to the village to conscript young men for their latest war project.  Because the farmer’s son has a broken leg they do not conscript him.  Neighbors congratulate the farmer on his good fortune.  The farmer shrugs and says, “Maybe so.”

It’s a famous story; you’ve probably heard it.  It suggests that human knowledge is limited and is not able to discern when something is a misfortune and when something is of benefit, when something is truly good or truly evil.  I have not run across similar thinking in Platonist sources, but I think this view is worth bringing into the conversation.  A Platonist gloss on this story might point out that as long as we are trapped in a limited, material, body, our understanding of our situation will also be limited.  It is only by separating the soul from the body that we can enter a more expansive wisdom where we can see things from a larger context, a context that transcends our mundane concerns and is rooted in the presence of eternity.

4.  I don’t have an answer to the problem of evil.  But I think it is worth pondering because pondering on the presence of evil in the world is a stimulus for wanting to transcend the world and this is true regardless of how, exactly, evil manifests.  Great minds have attempted to solve the problem of evil and I have found their insights on this topic to be helpful even if, in some sense, they are incomplete.  For the sad truth is that this is a world of suffering and sorrow, of division and discord, of strife and endless enmity; and the world is essentially this way, not accidentally this way, or superficially this way; as Plato writes “it is impossible that evils be done away with” in the material domain.

But there is a way that takes us beyond this realm of sorrow.  It is the way that Plato and Plotinus teach.  It is the path of renunciation, the path of following the light of the Good, the One, and the Beautiful to its source.

Philosophers and Their Relationship to Society

27 January 2024

Philosophers and Their Relationship to Society

Socrates:  ”’. . . Shall we describe those who belong to our band, or shall we let that go and return to the argument, in order to avoid abuse of that freedom and variety of discourse, of which we were speaking just now?’

Theodorus:  “’By all means, Socrates, describe them; for I like your saying that we who belong to this band are not the servants of our arguments, but the arguments are, as it were, our servants, and each of them must await our pleasure to be finished; for we have neither judge, nor, as the poets have, any spectator set over us to censure and rule us.’

Socrates:  “’Very well, that is quite appropriate, since it is your wish; and let us speak of the leaders; for why should anyone talk about the inferior philosophers?  The leaders, in the first place, from their youth up, remain ignorant of the way to the agora, do not even know where the court-room is, or the senate-house, or any other place of public assembly; as for laws and decrees, they neither hear the debates upon them nor see them when they are published; and the strivings of political clubs after public offices, and meetings, and banquets, and revellings with chorus girls, it never occurs to them even in their dreams to indulge in such things.  And whether anyone in the city is of high or low birth, or what evil has been inherited by anyone from his ancestors, male or female, are matters to which they pay no more attention than to the number of pints in the sea, as the saying is.  And all these things the philosopher does not even know that he does not know; for he does not keep aloof from them for the sake of gaining reputation, but really it is only his body that has its place and home in the city; his mind, considering all these things petty and of no account, disdains them and is borne in all directions, as Pindar says, “both below the earth,” and measuring the surface of the earth, and “above the sky,” studying the stars and investigating the universal nature of every thing that is, each in its entirety, never lowering itself to anything close at hand.’

Theodorus:  “’What do you mean by this, Socrates?’

Socrates:  “’Why, take the case of Thales, Theodorus.  While he was studying the stars and looking upwards, he fell into a pit, and a neat, witty Thracian servant girl jeered at him, they say, because he was so eager to know the things in the sky that he could not see what was there before him at his very feet.  The same jest applies to all who pass their lives in philosophy.  For really such a man pays no attention to his next door neighbour; he is not only ignorant of what he is doing, but he hardly knows whether he is a human being or some other kind of a creature; but what a human being is and what is proper for such a nature to do or bear different from any other, this he inquires and exerts himself to find out.  Do you understand, Theodorus, or not?’

Theodorus:  “’Yes, I do; you are right.’

Socrates:  “’Hence it is my friend, such a man, both in private, when he meets with individuals, and in public, as I said in the beginning, when he is obliged to speak in court or elsewhere about the things at his feet and before his eyes, is a laughing-stock not only to Thracian girls but to the multitude in general, for he falls into pits and all sorts of perplexities through inexperience, and his awkwardness is terrible, making him seem a fool; for when it comes to abusing people he has no personal abuse to offer against anyone, because he knows no evil of any man, never having cared for such things; so his perplexity makes him appear ridiculous; and as to laudatory speeches and the boastings of others, it becomes manifest that he is laughing at them – not pretending to laugh, but really laughing – and so he is thought to be a fool.  When he hears a panegyric of a despot or a king he fancies he is listening to the praises of some herdsman – a swineherd, a shepherd, or a neatherd, for instance – who gets much milk from his beasts; but he thinks that the ruler tends and milks a more perverse and treacherous creature than the herdsmen, and that he must grow coarse and uncivilized, no less than they, for he has no leisure and lives surrounded by a wall, as the herdsmen live in their mountain pens.  And when he hears that someone is amazingly rich, because he owns ten thousand acres of land or more, to him, accustomed as he is to think of the whole earth, this seems very little.  And when people sing the praises of lineage and say someone is of noble birth, because he can show seven wealthy ancestors, he thinks that such praises betray an altogether dull and narrow vision on the part of those who utter them; because of lack of education they cannot keep their eyes fixed upon the whole and are unable to calculate that every man has had countless thousands of ancestors and progenitors, among whom have been in any instance rich and poor, kings and slaves, barbarians and Greeks.  And when people pride themselves on a list of twenty-five ancestors and trace their pedigree back to Heracles, the son of Amphitryon, the pettiness of their ideas seems absurd to him; he laughs at them because they cannot free their silly minds of vanity by calculating that Amphitryon’s twenty-fifth ancestor was such as fortune happened to make him, and the fiftieth for that matter.  In all these cases the philosopher is derided by the common herd, partly because he seems to be contemptuous, partly because he is ignorant of common things and is always in perplexity.’

Theodorus:  “’That all happens just as you say, Socrates.’

Socrates:  “’But when, my friend, he draws a man upwards and the other is willing to rise with him above the level of “What wrong have I done you or your me?” to the investigation of abstract right and wrong, to inquire what each of them is and wherein they differ from each other and from all other things, or above the level of “Is a king happy?” or, on the other hand, “Has he great wealth?” to the investigation of royalty and of human happiness and wretchedness in general, to see what the nature of each is and in what way man is naturally fitted to gain the one and escape the other – when that man of small and sharp and pettifogging mind is compelled in his turn to give an account of all these things, then the tables are turned; dizzied by the new experience of hanging at such a height, he gazes downward from the air in dismay and perplexity; he stammers and becomes ridiculous, not in the eyes of Thracian girls or other uneducated persons, for they have no perception of it, but in those of all men who have been brought up as free men, not as slaves.  Such is the character of each of the two classes, Theodorus, of the man who has truly been brought up in freedom and leisure, whom you call a philosopher – who may without censure appear foolish and good for nothing when he is involved in menial services, if, for instance, he does not know how to pack up his bedding, much less to put the proper sweetening into a sauce or a fawning speech – and of the other, who can perform all such services smartly and quickly, but does not know how to wear his cloak as a freeman should, properly draped, still less to acquire the true harmony of speech and hymn aright the praises of the true life of gods and blessed men.’

Theodorus:  “’If, Socrates, you could persuade all men of the truth of what you say as you do me, there would be more peace and fewer evils among mankind.’”

(Plato, Theaetetus, translated by Harold North Fowler, Plato: Theaetetus, Sophist, Loeb Classical Library, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1921, pages 119-127, 173B-176A, ISBN: 0674991370)

1.  The above quote from Theaetetus is a well-known, and often referenced, digression in the dialogue where Socrates takes a few moments to discuss what the character of a philosopher is like, and how that character manifests in the observable behavior of ‘leaders’ of philosophy.  I think by ‘leaders’ Socrates means something like ‘first rate’ or ‘exemplary.’  This is a very helpful description of the philosopher and how the philosopher is viewed by non-philosophers.

2.  I think it would be helpful to read in conjunction with this passage from Theaetetus the section from Phaedo where Socrates details the ascetic practices of a philosopher; this is found at 64C to 64E. 

In Phaedo Socrates focuses on individual ascetic practices such as not indulging in rich food or in alcohol and refraining from the “pleasures of love.”  In Theaetetus the emphasis is on what I think of as ‘social asceticism’ because this dialogue depicts the nature of the philosophers’ social life.  There is overlap between the two (individual and social asceticism) but I think there is a difference in emphasis between the two dialogues.  Taken together they broaden our understanding of the specifics of Platonic asceticism.

3.  It is striking how the philosopher, as depicted in Theaetetus, refrains from political commitments or interactions.  I suspect this comes as a surprise to those, who are many, who consider Plato to be a political philosopher; for example those who view The Republic as a blueprint for an ideal state instead of viewing The Republic as an inquiry into the nature of the soul and the nature of justice which is fulfilled by exiting the ‘cave’ of ignorance and ascending into the light.  But if Theaetetus is viewed in the context of Phaedo and of The Republic as an allegory of spiritual ascent, then Theaetetus fits right in with the overall corpus of the Dialogues as a whole.

Plato’s teachings on asceticism are the key to understanding the Dialogues.

4.  It is also striking to me how Plato in this passage mocks pretensions of high status based on, for example, one’s ancestry.  The aristocratic class in Athens at that time was politically powerful and Plato came from that kind of class background.  Plato would have been familiar with these kinds of pretensions.  But through Plato’s study of philosophy he saw through these kinds of status seeking behaviors and saw their vanity and emptiness.  This will be expressed in The Republic when Plato states that a child of ‘gold’ can come from parents of ‘bronze.’

5.  The philosopher engages in what I sometimes call ‘the logic of withdrawal.’  This logic has a number of dimensions: individual behavior (see Phaedo), social behavior, body, speech, and mind.  In each of these dimensions the philosopher enacts an ascetic withdrawal so that the philosopher can use his time to focus on the one clear thing that transcends all interactions and appearances.

6.  The philosopher is drawn to the transcendental, the Good, the One, and the Beautiful.  The transcendental is non-sensory.  Because the philosopher is focused on the non-sensory he appears ‘foolish’ to those who are focused on the sensory domain. 

In modernity the existence of the transcendental is denied; which makes the life of the philosopher not just foolish, but completely deluded.  It takes the virtue of courage to overcome this context of modernity.  Such courage can be nourished and cultivated by reading the Dialogues and the Enneads.  And once the philosopher has had the experience of the transcendental, even if it is momentary, then all doubt about the journey’s worth vanishes.