Brief Notes on Various Topics -- 3

8 February 2024

Brief Notes on Various Topics – 3

1.  An interesting aspect of Mystical Monotheism by John Peter Kenney is that when seeking to understand the thought of Plotinus, Kenney contrasts the way Plotinus unpacks central Platonic views with the way the predecessors of Plotinus do so.  The way Kenney does this is by referring to the chronologically early Enneads with the idea that in these essays Plotinus would distinguish his views from his predecessors.  Kenney writes, “I propose taking advantage of our knowledge of the chronology of the writings and concentrating attention upon the earlier works, which clarify the grounds for Plotinus’s break with Middle Platonism . . . Within the earlier works, the novelty of his position seems to have required that Plotinus clarify his views over against the Middle Platonic school traditions and it is these treatises that I will be considering in some detail, especially V.9 (5), V4 (7), VI.9 (9), V.1 (10), V.2 (11), and III.9 (13).” [Note: the number in parentheses is the chronological number for the Ennead.  This means that the six Enneads Kenney is focusing on were among the first 13 Plotinus wrote.]

(John Peter Kenney, Mystical Monotheism, Wipf and Stock Publishers, Eugene, Oregon, 1991, pages 92 and 93, ISBN: 97810610970099)

This is the first time that a Plotinus scholar I have read presents a case for reading the Enneads in chronological order instead of the topical order brought to us by Porphyry.  It’s not that Kenney is making that argument explicitly; he doesn’t bring that up.  Rather Kenney is demonstrating that at least in this one case the chronological order was revealing of how Plotinus developed his Platonic views.

2.  The mind (small ‘m’ mind) is never satisfied.  It is perpetually restless.  This is why contemplation is difficult; because such contemplation sidelines the conceptual, or analytical, small ‘m’ mind.  For the Platonist practitioner this should be taken to heart.  There will never be a perfect presentation of Platonic metaphysics that cannot be improved, modified, elaborated, or simplified.  (The same applies to all other systems of thought.)  A good, general, understanding of Platonic metaphysics is necessary and sufficient.  Such general knowledge provides a good basis for contemplation and transcending the small ‘m’ mind.

3.  It has been my observation that Westerners have a deep resentment of ethical precepts; they don’t like being told what to do or how to behave.  I observed this during my Buddhist period.  It was very rare that I met someone who took the precepts seriously by, for example, refraining from alcohol.  The same resentment and resistance are observable among contemporary Platonists; the teachings of ascetic restraint are, for the most part, sidelined in favor of a kind of intellectual development that is disconnected from Platonist precepts, as if the two had nothing to do with each other.

4.  There is a section in Ennead II.4, On Matter where Plotinus is critiquing those who deny the existence of matter: “If we do deny the existence of matter we shall by the same argument be prevented from asserting the existence of qualities and size; for everything of this kind could be said to be nothing taken alone by itself.” [According to Armstrong, Plotinus is likely disputing with Aristotle.] (Plotinus, Ennead II.4, translated by A. H. Armstrong, Loeb Classical Library, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1966, page 137, ISBN: 9780674994867)

I have to admit that I’m one of those who leans towards the view of denying the existence of matter; I’m more of an idealist.  This is a common experience when reading Platonic literature, I mean coming across passages that you don’t agree with.  I think it is almost inevitable.  I think it is important not to become agitated about this.  One way to do this is to develop an intimate relationship with these works; this intimacy turns them into good friends.  We don’t expect our friends to agree with us on everything, or even most things.  Friendship is deeper than agreeing on a long list of topics.  A true friend allows us to disagree with that friend’s view because of the depth of the relationship.  Plato and Plotinus are more than friends, of course, but what I’m getting at is cultivating equanimity when disagreements arise and continuing the cultivation of the relationship.  When this is done several things can happen: I might discover I was wrong (which is what has happened most often with me), I might continue with the view I have, but that doesn’t disrupt the connection, or third, some other possibility might arise that neither of us thought of previously; there is something almost magical when that happens.

5.  If I were to express the nature of The One and The Good, I would say it is ‘clear like space.’